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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
The Disunity of Perception 
by 
Benjamin Henke 
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2021 
Professor Casey O’Callaghan, Chair 
This dissertation argues for disunity in perceptual processing: rather than outputting to a single 
‘centralized’ cognitive system, separate perceptual processing pathways produce different 
person-level representations for different purposes. I argue that this disunity has important 
implications for abstract theorizing in the philosophy and cognitive science of perception, for 
experimental methodology, and for our understanding of the normative role of perception itself. 
The first three chapters explore models in cognitive neuroscience which support perceptual 
disunity. In Chapter 1, I argue that a version of Milner and Goodale’s (2006) influential ‘two 
visual streams hypothesis’ survives its recent empirical challenges. In Chapter 2, I present a new 
conception of visual streams as core mechanisms for person-level representation-types. In 
Chapter 3, I argue that the function of functional division in the visual system is to realize both 
‘task-coupled’ and ‘task-decoupled’ processing approaches in response to the same downstream 
task. Chapters 4 and 5 begin the work of investigating the normative implications of disunified 
perception. Chapter 4 argues for a responsibilist account of the epistemology of perception, on 
which we are epistemically responsible to indirectly influence our perceptual states in order to 
produce good epistemic outcomes. Chapter 5 explores the role of non-epistemic factors in 
vi
determining our epistemic responsibilities. I argue for an account of ‘pragmatic encroachment’ 
that I call ‘degree encroachment’, on which non-epistemic factors influence the *degree* of 
continuous justification conferred by one’s perceptual experiences. 
vii
Introduction 
In “The Modularity of Mind,” Jerry Fodor (1983) begins by considering the implications of 
conceiving of the mind as a computer, that is, as a symbol manipulator that operates only on the 
syntactic relations between those symbols.  Thus, whereas abstract theorizing about computers 
emphasizes the nature of those syntactic operations, a crucial part of theorizing about the mind is 
to understand how worldy information is transformed into a format which is accessible to 
thought—that is, how perceptual and other ‘input’ systems turn sensory stimulation into 
syntactically-structured representations for cognition—and how thought itself is transformed into 
a format which is accessible to action systems—that is, how syntactically-structured 
representations in cognition are transformed back into analog behaviors. In setting out his 
modularist theory of mind, he aims to begin to answer that first question: input systems are 
modules whose primary function is to transform ‘analog’ perceptual inputs into syntactically 
structured inputs for thought. 
Fodor’s presentation begins by considering a (plausible) thesis about what cognition is — 
namely that cognition is a computer that functions to transform perception inputs into action 
outputs — it then asks what job is performed by perception, given this characterization of 
cognition — namely, it must transform sensory stimulation into a format accessible to thought — 
and it then concludes that what perception is is a system which performs this role. On Fodor’s 
telling, “what perception must do is to so represent the world as to make it accessible to 
thought…” thus “perception is a mechanism of belief fixation par excellence: the normal 
consequence of a perceptual transaction is the acquisition of a perceptual belief” (Fodor 1983, 
40). This way of approaching the study of perception — by first considering its role in realizing 
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the function of cognition — implies a ‘centralized’ architecture of the mind on which cognition 
always mediates perceptual inputs and action outputs, what Susan Hurley (1998, 1) has called 
“the classical sandwich.” And that centralized architecture in turn entails what I’ll call a ‘unified’ 
conception of perception: which perceptual processes uniformly output to a single downstream 
node (i.e. cognition). 
This dissertation is motivated by the dominance of the foregoing approach to the study of 
perception and to our corresponding commitment to a unified conception of perception. The 
unity assumption oversimplifies the nature of perceptual systems and thus their downstream 
impacts on action. This oversimplification leads us to overlook important aspects of the nature of 
perception, of our downstream actions, and thus of the fundamental nature of the mind. My aim 
is therefore to highlight ways in which the mind is not unified around a central processor, i.e. that 
perception is not unified, but instead generates different perceptual products for different 
downstream tasks. Rather than thinking of the mind as a computer, then, I propose that it’s more 
accurate and more productive to think of the mind as an organized network, with separate but 
interconnected systems operating in parallel to realize mental functions. Recognizing this, I 
think, has broad-reaching implications for our conception of ourselves and of the sorts of ways in 
which we can and should exhibit self-control. 
The first aim of this dissertation is to argue for what I call ‘representational disunity’ in 
perception, the claim that perceptual systems perform their role by the creation of multiple, 
distinct representation types for distinct person-level functional roles. My argument for that view 
is primarily empirical, and turns on facts about how mental systems organize. Establishing 
representational disunity across perception would require attention to considerations from a 
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broad range of literatures in cognitive science and philosophy. Thus, my goals here are 
comparatively modest: I explore just a few models from cognitive neuroscience which indicate 
representational disunity. 
My primary aim in the first three chapters of the dissertation is to defend a version of ‘the 
two visual streams’ view, most prominently defended by Milner and Goodale (2006), that both 
survives recent empirical and philosophical challenges and which better orients focus around 
representational disunity, which I argue is the most important implication of that model. 
Chapter 1 defends a new model of the visual streams that I call “Dorsal-Control”. According 
to Dorsal-Control, dorsal stream representations impact action systems directly, without 
cognitive intermediaries. Since perceptual representations also impact action via cognition, direct 
dorsal control entails representational disunity. I argue that Dorsal-Control is both consistent with 
the current empirical evidence and nonetheless has the central implications of the stronger 
model. 
Representational Disunity is neutral between a wide variety of underlying architectures, 
including ones on which separate representation-types are created by separate visuomotor 
modules (as Milner and Goodale suggest), and ones on which those representations are generated 
by more integrated systems (as I suggest in Chapter 1). Given this neutrality, one might think that 
my conclusions from Chapter 1 leave no place in cognitive science for the notion of a ‘stream’ of 
visual processing. My aim in Chapter 2 is thus to re-situate the literature on the visual streams 
around a conception of the streams as ‘core mechanisms’ for functionally-individuated 
representation types. I first argue that substantial inter-stream connection undermines the 
prospect for a modular conception of the streams. I then articulate a new account of the streams 
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on which they are neurally-isolable core mechanisms for functionally-individuated 
representation types. I then go on to argue that this conception of a visual stream both survives 
recent empirical challenges to the visual streams while doing meaningful theoretical and 
explanatory work in the cognitive science of perception. 
The mechanistic conception of a visual stream salvages the visual streams from otherwise 
apparently devastating objections. In doing so, however, it raises a more fundamental question 
about the function of the visual streams. Why does the perceptual system divide and conquer, 
dedicating separate core mechanisms to different roles, rather than simply generating unified 
representations which are deployed across task-types. This question, addressed in Chapter 3, is at 
the heart of my rejection of the unified conception of the mind. I begin by presenting evidence 
against the received view, defended by Milner and Goodale, that the separate visual streams 
allow different streams to meet the conflicting task-demands of perception and action. 
Specifically, I argue that there is now evidence for the involvement of multiple streams—with 
very different computational properties—involved in the same downstream tasks. If so, then the 
division between the streams cannot be justified by a simple conflict in the computational 
demands of different tasks. Next, I consider an account, reminiscent of Briscoe and Schwenkler’s 
(2015) account of the role of the two visual stream in motor guidance, according to which the 
function of the division is instead to realize the task-neutral computational advantages of 
employing both quick-and-dirty and slow-and-intelligent computations. I argue that this view has 
clear advantages over Milner and Goodale’s account, but fails to explain why some visual 
streams, specifically the dorsal stream and low-road, appear to be largely dedicated to the 
performance of just one downstream task while the ventral stream appears to operate task-
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neutrally. I then defend an account according to which the division between streams is in fact one 
between task-coupled and task-decoupled computations. This account—specifically the dorsal 
stream and low-road—are task-coupled, in that they are dedicated to the quick-and-dirty 
performance of task-specific computations while another system—specifically the ventral stream
—is task-decoupled, such that it is engaged in slow and deliberate task-neutral computations. 
The division between the visual streams has the function of allowing for both task-coupled and 
task-decoupled computational resources to be applied to the same downstream types of task, 
optimizing performance. 
At the end of Chapter 3, I highlight an important implication of disunity on our capacity for 
self-control. While we can often realize direct top-down control over ventral stream’s input on 
action, our control over dorsal stream and the low-road is more indirect. This is because the latter 
systems are coupled, preventing synchronous influence over its outputs, but allowing for broader 
regulation via modulation of ourselves or our environment. In Chapter 4, I begin to explore the 
normative implications of indirect control. Focusing on perceptual experience, I develop a 
framework for analyzing the epistemic import of indirect influence on perception. I argue that 
beliefs based on irresponsibly formed experiences—experiences whose causes were not 
appropriately regulated by the subject—are doxastically unjustified. This chapter thus sets out a 
responsibility framework whereby we can analyze the epistemic import of indirect influences on 
our mental states and downstream actions. This framework allows us to begin to understand our 
epistemic obligations with respect to coupled perception/action systems. 
The argument presented in Chapter 4 relies on the idea that non-epistemic features of one’s 
context can help determine one’s epistemic responsibilities. Specifically, it assumes that being an 
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expert perceiver in a domain, in the sense that one is deferred to in making perceptual judgments 
in that domain, gives you special obligations to follow rules about perceiving in that domain. 
This account entails a version of pragmatic encroachment—on which non-epistemic factors help 
to determine epistemic ones. Chapter 5 attempts to articulate a new kind of encroachment that is 
most fitting with the account in Chapter 4. Specifically, it defends what I call ‘degree 
encroachment’, the view that non-epistemic factors can encroach on the degree of continuous 
justification one has for one’s belief. Paired with the responsibilist epistemic account in Chapter 
4, degree encroachment suggests that our epistemic obligations concern ways in which we are 
reasonably expected to comport ourselves in order to realize good epistemic outcomes, even 
when that influence is indirect. Thus, the normative account developed in Chapters 4 and 5 allow 
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Chapter 1: A Fresh Look at the Two Visual Streams 
According to what I’ll call the “Two Visual Systems Account” (TWO-SYSTEMS), the visual 
system is divided into two independent sub-systems, a ventral system implementing “vision for 
perception” and a dorsal system implementing “vision for action” (Milner and Goodale, 2006). 
TWO-SYSTEMS is widely discussed in philosophy due to the counterintuitive role that it posits for 
conscious experience in the control of actions. However, recent evidence undermines the model’s 
core tenets: it no longer appears that the ventral and dorsal streams constitute isolated processing 
systems, and there is now evidence for the involvement of both streams in both conscious 
experience and online motor control. I articulate a new “Direct Dorsal Control Account” 
(DORSAL-CONTROL), show that it is immune to three empirical challenges facing TWO-SYSTEMS, 
and show that it nonetheless has similarly significant implications for the perceiving mind. 
Section 1.1 articulates TWO-SYSTEMS and its philosophical implications. Section 1.2 
describes three empirical challenges to TWO-SYSTEMS. Section 1.3 articulates DORSAL-CONTROL 
and shows that it is immune to the three challenges. Section 1.4 articulates DORSAL-CONTROL’s 
philosophical implications. 
1.1 The Two Visual Systems Account 
The primate cortical visual system is composed of two anatomically distinct streams, a ventral 
stream extending laterally from V1 into inferotemporal cortex, and a dorsal stream extending 
dorsally from V1 into the posterior parietal lobe. TWO-SYSTEMS holds that these streams 
constitute independent sub-systems, each with a proprietary function. 
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To explain this proposal, Goodale and Milner (2004) draw an analogy to the guidance of a 
hypothetical Martian rover. The rover’s job is to navigate the terrain and collect samples. To help 
it accomplish these goals, engineers on earth assess the contents of the rover’s sensors and send 
action programs about what it should do next. But since there is a substantial delay between 
Earth and Mars, it would be inadvisable for the rover to execute exact movements on the basis of 
mission control’s program. Instead, the rover must update the program in response to in-the-
moment conditions. Thus, the rover is fitted with an additional onboard system which 
independently assesses the scene and makes fine-grained adjustments to the action program. 
When collecting samples, for example it uses its sensors and onboard systems to guide its limbs 
toward the target. The rover’s behavior is thus controlled by two systems: a smart but slow 
controller system which selects action programs, and a dumb but quick onboard system which 
guides the fine-grained execution of those programs. 
TWO-SYSTEMS proposes a similar division in the cortical visual system. The ventral system 
outputs directly to cognition, enabling smart but slow selection of action programs. And the 
dorsal system outputs directly to action systems to enable dumb but quick guidance of those 
programs. For example, if I aim to catch a baseball hit into the outfield, ventral stream and 
downstream cognition select an action program—e.g. “run over there and catch the ball”—while 
the dorsal stream guides the execution of that program—e.g. by enabling me to keep a constant 
angle between the horizon and the ball, ensuring that I arrive at the bottom of the ball’s arc as it 
moves across the field. 
TWO-SYSTEMS posits ventral and dorsal systems which perform their respective functions in 
isolation. It follows both that cognition employs exclusively ventral stream representations in the 
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selection of action programs and that action systems are guided exclusively by dorsal stream 
representations in the execution of those programs. Three important implications follow from 
this conception of the two visual streams. 
First, TWO-SYSTEMS controverts pretheoretic assumptions about conscious experience’s role 
in action. According to what Clark (2001) calls the “assumption of experience-based control,” 
conscious visual experience is employed in “the control and guidance of fine-tuned real world 
activity”. But TWO-SYSTEMS holds that online motor control is instead executed using 
unconscious dorsal stream processes, not conscious ventral stream ones. 
Second, TWO-SYSTEMS has revisionary architectural implications. A popular view of the 
mind holds that perceptual processes function to transform sensory information into a format 
accessible to central cognitive processes (Fodor, 1983; for an opposing view, which is much 
closer to the one defended here, see Nanay, 2013). But if dorsal stream processes influence 
action systems directly, without cognitive intermediaries, then this common assumption is false. 
Instead, perceptual systems perform multiple distinct functions in perceptual/motor control, only 
some of which directly involve cognition. 
Third, TWO-SYSTEMS informs the role of action in the study of conscious experience. 
Researchers often infer that a feature is present in perceptual experience from the fact that our 
behavior is sensitive to that feature. But if action systems employ unconscious dorsal stream 
processes in the online control of behavior, then such inferences are suspect. For example, Clark 
(2001) has argued that TWO-SYSTEMS undermines common arguments for so-called "cognitive 
overflow,” the claim that the contents of perceptual experience are more detailed than our 
cognitive representations of them. 
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1.2 Three Empirical Challenges to TWO-SYSTEMS 
TWO-SYSTEMS claims that ventral and dorsal streams constitute independent processing systems 
and that each has a separate, proprietary function. Each of these claims is challenged in the 
empirical literature. 
First, empirical evidence undermines TWO-SYSTEMS’s claim that the ventral and dorsal 
constitute independent processing systems. While exact conditions for independence are 
controversial, it is widely agreed that significant functional or informational connectivity 
between streams is evidence against independence. And there is now evidence for widespread 
interconnectivity of both types between the two streams. First, neuroanatomical studies have 
revealed substantial functional connectivity between ventral and dorsal streams (for reviews,  see 
van Polanen and Davare, 2015; Cloutman, 2013; Grafton, 2010). And this functional 
connectivity appears to produce informational connectivity as well, such that information 
processed in one stream is employed in computations in the other stream (Schenk and McIntosh, 
2010; van Polanen and Davare, 2015). In sum, as Schenk and McIntosh (2010) put it “The 
ubiquity and extent of inter-stream interactions suggest that we should reject the idea that the 
ventral and dorsal streams are functionally independent processing pathways.” 
Second, there is now evidence for dorsal stream influence on conscious experience. As 
Schenk and McIntosh (2010) report, while early studies of optic ataxics (who have isolated 
dorsal stream damage) appear to demonstrate deficits in perceptual-motor control without 
corresponding deficits in conscious report, apparently confirming TWO-SYSTEMS’s predictions 
(Karnath & Perenin, 2005), more refined studies have found that optic ataxics have subtle but 
persistent differences in conscious experience (Michel and Henaff, 2004; Perenin and Vighetto, 
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1988; Pisella et al., 2009; Striemer et al., 2007, Striemer, Chapman, & Goodale, 2009; Striemer 
et al., 2009). This evidence suggests that dorsal stream processes influence either conscious 
object representations or conscious attention or both (van Polanen and Davare 2015). 
Philosophers have also suggested that dorsal stream processes may influence structural features 
of conscious experience, such as its spatial format (Wu, 2014) or ‘feeling of presence’ (Matthen, 
2005). 
Third, there is also evidence for ventral stream’s involvement in online motor control. Here 
again, while early lesion studies among those with isolated ventral stream damage seemed to 
support TWO-SYSTEMS’s predictions—demonstrating deficits in conscious report without 
corresponding deficits in perceptual-motor control—more refined studies have revealed that such 
subjects have systematic deficits in online motor control when performing complex tasks, such 
as fitting a T-shaped object through a slot (Goodale et al., 1994; McIntosh and Lashley, 2008; 
Schenk and McIntosh, 2010). Briscoe and Schwenkler (2015) have suggested a kind of dual-
systems account of the role of ventral and dorsal streams in perceptual motor control: dorsal 
stream is responsible for the direct control of easy, familiar aspects of tasks, but heavily recruits 
ventral stream representations in executing novel or difficult motor commands. 
These three challenges, taken together, constitute a complete refutation of TWO-SYSTEMS. 
The rest of this chapter argues that a new view, which captures the central functional claims of 
Milner and Goodale’s account, and which has similarly important implications for the perceiving 
mind, survives the challenges. 
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1.3 The Direct Dorsal Control Account 
The central claim of this chapter is this: the main upshots of Milner and Goodale’s model hold if 
there are perceptual representations which directly influence action systems, without cognitive 
intermediaries. DORSAL-CONTROL is the claim that at least some dorsal stream representations 
play this role. In this section, I clarify DORSAL-CONTROL and show that it is immune to the 
empirical challenges raised against TWO-SYSTEMS. 
The claim that a representation influences action systems directly, without cognitive 
intermediaries, is equivalent to the claim that action systems have direct access to those 
representations, not just downstream cognitive representations. Thus, DORSAL-CONTROL holds 
that action systems directly recruit dorsal stream representations in the execution of action 
programs. This claim follows from TWO-SYSTEMS, since the latter entails that the dorsal system 
implements “vision for action” without cognitive intermediaries. But DORSAL-CONTROL is 
strictly weaker than TWO-SYSTEMS, as it entails neither that the ventral and dorsal streams 
constitute independent processing systems nor that either has a proprietary functional role. 
It’s important to distinguish DORSAL-CONTROL from the claim that dorsal stream 
representations are unique in their guidance of action programs. The former holds only that 
dorsal representations at least sometimes perform a particular functional role, not the stronger 
claim that they are the only perceptual representations to do so. It is nonetheless worth noting 
that the stronger claim is also plausibly true. That is, even if, as the third challenge contends, 
ventral stream processes influence action programs, it is likely that they do so only via 
downstream cognitive representations and processes. Thus, DORSAL-CONTROL provides a 
13
framework via which one can rescue the central functional division proposed by Milner and 
Goodale. 
DORSAL-CONTROL is a claim about the downstream effects of dorsal stream representations, 
not its upstream causes. Thus, it is consistent with the possibility of causal influence of ventral 
stream  or cognitive representations and processes on dorsal stream processes. Even if, for 
example, dorsal stream processes recruit ventral stream object representations in carrying out 
complex guidance tasks (van Polanen and Davare, 2015), the resulting dorsal stream 
representations can still influence action systems directly without cognitive (or ventral stream) 
intermediaries.  
Moreover, DORSAL-CONTROL makes no claim of exclusivity in dorsal stream’s effects. That 
is, the claim that some dorsal stream representations directly influence action programs is 
consistent with those or other dorsal stream representations also influencing states and processes 
elsewhere in the mind. Thus, DORSAL-CONTROL is consistent with dorsal stream influences, even 
conscious influences, on ventral stream or cognition. 
Consider the first challenge. Since TWO-SYSTEMS posits independent ventral and dorsal 
processing systems, it is challenged by evidence for substantial functional and informational 
connectivity between the streams. But since DORSAL-CONTROL doesn’t require that the streams 
be independent, it is consistent with such connectivity. What matters is that dorsal stream 
representations directly influence action programs. And this claim is widely accepted in the 
literature, even among TWO-SYSTEMS’s opponents. As Schenk and McIntosh (2010, 52) put it in 
one of their many concessive remarks on this point: “[Milner and Goodale’s account] captures 
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some broad patterns of functional localization, but… the specializations of the two streams are 
relative, not absolute.” 
Next, consider the second challenge. Since TWO-SYSTEMS holds that ventral stream is 
exclusively responsible for the formation of conscious experience, it is challenged by evidence 
for dorsal stream influence on conscious experience. DORSAL-CONTROL, by contrast, makes no 
claim about ventral stream’s exclusive role. It is thus consistent with dorsal stream influence on 
conscious experience. 
One might reply that if dorsal stream contributes to conscious experience, then on the 
reasonable assumption that a state is conscious only if it is accessible to cognition, dorsal stream 
must output to cognition, not directly to action programs. This reply is mistaken in two ways. 
First, it assumes that dorsal stream can influence conscious experience only if some of its 
representations are themselves conscious. But dorsal stream can influence conscious experience
—even if its representations are unconscious—by having conscious representations among its 
downstream effects. This would happen, for example, if dorsal stream had downstream causal 
influence on conscious ventral stream representations. This possibility is inconsistent with TWO-
SYSTEMS, since that theory holds that ventral stream is causally isolated from dorsal stream and 
that ventral stream has proprietary influence over conscious visual representations. But it is 
consistent with DORSAL-CONTROL, which makes neither claim. 
Second, the reply assumes that a representation’s being directly accessible to cognition is 
inconsistent with that representation also being directly accessible to action systems. But a single 
representation can be recruited by multiple distinct processes or systems. Thus, it’s consistent 
with DORSAL-CONTROL—but not, again, with TWO-SYSTEMS—that the very representations 
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which directly guide action programs also directly contribute to conscious experience. As we’ll 
see below, the latter does not negate the importance of the former. 
Finally, consider the third challenge. Since TWO-SYSTEMS holds that dorsal stream is 
exclusively responsible for online motor guidance, it is challenged by evidence for ventral stream 
influence on online motor activity. But DORSAL-CONTROL simply claims that dorsal stream 
representations are directly involved in online motor guidance, not that that involvement is 
exclusive. It is thus consistent with ventral stream involvement. Indeed, those who posit ventral 
stream influence on online motor activity either posit such influence via dorsal stream 
representations or, as Briscoe and Schwenkler (2015) suggest, in conjunction with it. Thus, 
ventral stream influence on online motor activity is not a threat to DORSAL-CONTROL. 
1.4 Implications of DORSAL-CONTROL 
To see why DORSAL-CONTROL entails the same general implications for the perceiving mind, it’s 
helpful to see that the three implications discussed in Section 1 are intricately linked. Our 
pretheoretic assumption is that experience plays a direct role in the fine-grained guidance of our 
actions. And we assume that this role is mediated by our choices. That is, we assume that we use 
fine-grained details of our perceptual experiences to make decisions about how we will enact our 
will in the world. But if TWO-SYSTEMS is right, then both assumptions are false: if unconscious 
dorsal stream processes uniquely guide online motor activity, without cognitive intermediaries, 
then experience and downstream cognition have a less direct role in that activity. And these first 
two implications entail the third: if experience and our decisions play only an indirect role in 
online control, then direct inferences from behavior to experience (or cognition) are suspect.  
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Because DORSAL-CONTROL, like TWO-SYSTEMS, breaks the intricate connection previously 
assumed between conscious experience and motor control, a connection which we assumed was 
mediated by cognition, it has these same implications. That is, if dorsal stream representations 
influence online motor control directly, then cognition-mediated perceptual representations do 
not do the work we thought they did in controlling our actions. And this undermines direct 
inferences from behavior to experience. 
One might respond as follows: “You acknowledged above that it’s consistent with DORSAL-
CONTROL that the very dorsal stream representations which directly influence online motor 
activity are also consciously accessible. Don’t the implications rely on a lack of conscious 
accessibility? That is, isn’t it an important feature of TWO-SYSTEMS that unconscious dorsal 
stream representations guide online motor activity?” This, I think, is the central mistake we make 
about the philosophical import of the two visual streams. It doesn’t so much matter whether 
dorsal stream representations are conscious. It matters whether they control behavior because 
they’re conscious. And according to DORSAL-CONTROL, they do not: even if dorsal stream 
representations are consciously accessible, they perform their guiding role directly, 
independently of any conscious influence on cognition. 
An analogy will help make this final point. Imagine driving a car which has screens and 
cameras in place of windows. As you move along, you look at the screens and move the wheel 
and pedals as you normally would. It seems to you that you have the same kind of control over 
the car as you normally do. That is, you use what you see on the screen to make decisions about 
how you move the wheel and pedals to get you where you want to go. But this impression is 
mistaken. The car is instead driven by an autopilot. This autopilot uses your movements to 
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roughly determine where it will go (this is analogous to the role of ventral stream and cognition 
in selecting action programs), but the actual online control of the car is entirely controlled by its 
independent decisions (analogous to the direct role of dorsal stream in the guidance of action 
programs).  
The picture given to us by TWO-SYSTEMS is one on which the system creating the images on 
the screen is entirely independent of the system which controls the car. This is analogous to the 
idea that the dorsal stream representations controlling online activity are unconscious. But 
suppose instead that the autopilot operates over the very representations you employ in making 
your decisions. That is, the autopilot, like you, is looking at the images on the screen and making 
decisions about how to maneuver the car in light of those images. You’re looking at the very 
representations employed in the control of the car. This picture is analogous to one on which 
dorsal stream representations both directly influence online motor control (and thus DORSAL-
CONTROL is true) and are consciously accessible to cognition. Does this dual access salvage our 
pretheoretic judgments about the perceiving mind? 
I think not. The representations that we see on the screen are employed in the online control 
of the car, but not by us. The representations on the screen control the behavior of the car and we 
can see them, but they do not control the behavior of the car because we can see them. That is, 
even on this picture, the autopilot is performing a role we don’t expect it to perform. This picture 
is just as surprising as, and more empirically plausible than, the one suggested by TWO-SYSTEMS.  
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Chapter 2: Visual Streams as Core Mechanisms 
In Chapter 1, I defended DORSAL-CONTROL, the claim that dorsal stream representations directly 
influence action systems, without cognitive intermediaries. This thesis, along with the claim that 
visual experiences influence action via cognition, entails representational disunity, the claim that 
multiple distinct representations are involved in performing vision’s person-level functional 
roles. 
In defending DORSAL-CONTROL, I argued that it, but not a dual-systems view, is consistent 
with evidence for substantial functional interaction between the streams, and for each stream’s 
involvement in the other’s characteristic function. But I also argued that DORSAL-CONTROL 
retains the central implications of Milner and Goodale’s (2006) model. Such an argument might 
appear to leave little room for the idea of a visual stream in the cognitive science of perception. 
If what matters is simply a disunity in representations—which could be realized in an otherwise 
unified processing system—then it’s no longer clear what work is left for the idea of separate 
processing streams for different purposes. 
The aim of this chapter is to re-situate the idea of a visual stream in the study of perception. 
Visual streams play an explanatory role, I’ll argue, but not the one traditionally ascribed to them 
among defenders of the two visual streams. I suggest two revisions to that traditional notion. 
First, I’ll argue that we should conceive of a visual stream, not as an isolated processing module, 
but rather as the core mechanism for a functionally-individuated representation-type. Second, 
and in virtue of this mechanistic conception of a visual stream, I’ll suggest that the study of 
visual streams is explanatorily secondary to the study of representational disunity. That is, the 
central explananda in the study of the visual streams are neither anatomical and computational 
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features of visual processing nor downstream behavior. Rather, the central explananda are the 
existence and features of the representations the visual streams characteristically produce. These 
revisions are both conservative—in that they capture the central work required of a visual stream 
in the empirical literature—and revisionary—in that they reject the conceptual apparatus 
typically employed in that literature. 
The chapter will proceed in three sections. In Section 2.1, I’ll articulate the traditional 
conception of the streams as modules, and provide two reasons—one empirical and one 
theoretical—for why we should reject that conception. In Section 2.2, I’ll present a new 
conception—on which a visual stream is a core mechanism for a functionally-individuated 
representation type—and highlight its consistency with the empirical evidence. In Section 2.3, 
I’ll articulate the role that this new conception of a visual stream can play in the study of visual 
perception. 
2.1 The Visual Streams as Modules 
In The Modularity of Mind, Jerry Fodor (1983) lists nine features that characterize modules. 
Modules are informationally encapsulated — in that they operate over only local information 
stores — they’re inaccessible — in that other systems do not have access to those information 
stores — they’re domain specific — in that they operate over narrow subject matters — their 
processes are mandatory, fast, and have ‘shallow’ (roughly, coarse-grained) outputs, and they’re 
underwritten by a fixed neural architecture with characteristic and specific breakdown patterns 
and a characteristic ontogenetic pace and sequencing. Fodor holds that a system is a module if it 
has these properties “to some interesting extent” (Fodor, 1983, 37). Moreover, among the nine, 
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Fodor thought that informational encapsulation was most important, as substantial informational 
encapsulation is both essential for modularity and explanatorily prior to many of the other 
features. While there has been substantial debate over both his account of modularity and the 
empirical case for mental modules, his treatment, and in particular his focus on informational 
encapsulation, has remained the default working account of modularity in philosophy and the 
cognitive sciences. 
At the beginning of their seminal book on the two visual streams, Milner and Goodale (2006) 
contrast prior ‘input-only’ conceptions of modularity in the visual system — such as Marr’s 
(1982) postulation of visual primitives — with their own account, which also posits modularity 
‘on the output side’ (Milner and Goodale 2006, 6, 14). That is, where prior accounts posited 
visual modules which function to process local features of an ultimately unified visual 
representation, Milner and Goodale argue that the visual streams constitute ‘visuomotor’ 
modules, which generate separate representations for different downstream tasks, i.e. visual 
perception and motor control (2006, 5). In beginning their book in this way, they thus cement 
their commitment both to what I’ve called representational disunity, and to a modularist account 
of that disunity. 
Milner and Goodale note that sub-cortical visuomotor modules are present throughout the 
animal kingdom. Ingle (1973), for example, traced separate subcortical pathways in frogs (Rana 
pipiens) from the retina to the motor nuclei for different kinds of visually guided behavior. “The 
fact that the frog possesses this parallel set of independent visuomotor pathways,” Milner and 
Goodale say, “does not fit well with the common view of a visual system dedicated to the 
construction of a unified representation of the external world” (2006, 11). Moreover, they point 
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to evidence for a similar division in the subcortical visual system of rats, concluding “the 
modular organization of visuomotor behaviour in representative species of at least one 
mammalian order, the rodents, appears to resemble that of much simpler vertebrates such as the 
frog and toad. In both groups of animals, visually elicited orienting movements, visually elicited 
escape, and visually guided locomotion around barriers are mediated by quite separate pathways 
from the retina right through to motor nuclei in the brain-stem and spinal cord. This striking 
homology in neural architecture suggests that modularity in visuomotor control is an ancient 
(and presumably efficient) characteristic of vertebrate brains” (2006, 17).  
The questions that Milner and Goodale seek to answer, then, are, first, does visuomotor 
modularity extend into the cortical visual system? and, second, is there evidence for such 
modularity in ‘higher’ mammalian orders, such as primates, whose cortical visual systems are 
more developed? They answer ‘yes’ to both questions. Specifically, they claim that “two separate 
networks of areas have evolved in the primate visual cortex: a perceptual system which is 
indirectly linked to action via cognitive processes, and a visuomotor system which is intimately 
linked with motor control” (2006, 20). 
Given the dominance of Fodor’s conception of a module, however, the preceding discussion 
should puzzle us. In explicitly arguing for visuomotor modularity, Milner and Goodale focus 
entirely on evidence for the anatomical separation between visual subsystems and the functions 
associated with those subsystems. But to establish that the streams are modules, one must show 
that they satisfy certain computational features — especially that they operate only over local 
information stores — not simply that they’re anatomically separable. 
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Milner and Goodale clearly think of the visual streams as broadly Fodorian modules, 
however, and they provide evidence which supports a number of Fodor’s criteria, beyond mere 
anatomical separation. The initial evidence for their account, for example, comes from lesion 
studies in which subjects with isolated damage to one stream impacts that stream’s characteristic 
function (visual perception or motor control) without impacting the other stream’s function 
(Milner & Goodale, 2006). This suggests characteristic and specific breakdown patterns of the 
two streams. And Milner and Goodale clearly take these breakdowns as evidence for 
informational encapsulation (e.g., 2006, 121). Similarly, their account is famously supported by 
studies demonstrating that visual perception, but not motor control, is subject to certain illusions, 
such as the Ebbinghaus or Müller-Lyer illusions (2006, ch. 6). This suggests that the two streams 
operate over separate information stores, supporting informational encapsulation and 
inaccessibility. Finally, Milner and Goodale argue extensively that each stream is specialized to 
certain contents — such as joint angles for motor guidance or object identities for visual 
perception — and that they operate over different spatial formats — egocentric formats for motor 
guidance and allocentric ones for perception (e.g. 2006, section 4.1). This suggests a kind of 
domain-specificity between the two streams. 
Milner and Goodale’s claim that the two streams are dedicated to particular functions — 
visual perception and motor guidance, respectively — has been largely accepted in the empirical 
literature. The debate regarding their account has focused, instead, on whether the streams 
constitute informationally-isolated modules. As Schenk and McIntosh (2010, 52) put it in their 
review of evidence against the model, “…the perception–action model captures some broad 
patterns of functional localization, but the specializations of the two streams are relative, not 
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absolute. The ubiquity and extent of inter-stream interactions suggest that we should reject the 
idea that the ventral and dorsal streams are functionally independent processing pathways.” 
Thus, both supporters and detractors of Milner and Goodale’s model seem to agree that the 
visual pathways are interesting to the extent that they constitute isolated modules. By extension, 
it’s also generally agreed that the model and its implications rise or fall with the claim that the 
streams are at least largely informationally encapsulated.  
This conception of the visual streams faces two challenges. The first, discussed in Chapter 1, 
is empirical: there is now evidence for substantial informational connectivity between the 
streams and with extra-perceptual systems. The dorsal stream appears to recruit ventral stream 
representations to enable sensitivity to allocentric spatial features (Schenk & McIntosh, 2010), 
pictorial depth (Schenk & McIntosh, 2010), and object identity (Carey, Harvey, & Milner, 1996; 
Dijkerman, Milner, & Carey, 1998; McIntosh, Dijkerman, Mon-Williams, & Milner, 2004; 
Dijkerman, McIntosh, Schindler, Nijboer, & Milner, 2009; van Polanen & Davare, 2015) when 
engaging in tasks requiring complex fine-tuning of grasp. And the ventral stream appears to 
recruit dorsal stream representations to determine object location and orientation (Michel & 
Henaff, 2004; Perenin & Vighetto, 1988; Pisella et al., 2009) and to control conscious attention 
(Michel & Henaff, 2004; Pisella et al., 2009; Striemer et al., 2007; Striemer, Chapman, & 
Goodale, 2009; Striemer et al., 2009). Such connectivity between the streams directly challenges 
the claim that the streams are informationally encapsulated and inaccessible modules.  
The second problem with the modularist conception of the visual streams is more theoretical. 
As I’ve suggested above, the empirical debate surrounding the two visual streams has largely 
centered on the question of whether the visual streams operate over proprietary information 
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stores and thus are modular. This trend gives the impression that the central implications of the 
model rise or fall with modularity. But most of Milner and Goodale’s most radical claims are 
independent of the modularity question. I’ll review several such instances. 
First, of course, the central claim of Milner and Goodale’s model is a claim about the central 
function of the respective streams. The dorsal stream has the function of guiding online motor 
activity while the ventral stream has the function of generating largely conscious perceptual 
representations. That claim can be true even if the streams are not modules. This functional 
division might reflect the claim, defended in Chapter 1, that the streams are vehicles for the 
representations driving these respective tasks. This would constitute a minimal functional 
division between the streams. Moreover, even if the streams interact, it could still be the case that 
the bulk of the processing determining the different features of these different representations are 
also performed within the respective streams. For example, van Polanen and Davare (2015) 
review evidence that dorsal stream processes recruit ventral stream object representations when 
engaging in tasks requiring complex fine-tuning of grasp, for example when determining the 
appropriate grip for tool use. One might therefore appropriately conclude that the ventral stream 
is involved in motor control in such cases. But van Polanen and Davare themselves suggest that 
object information is probably not employed directly in determining motor control 
representations, but is rather translated into a format more appropriate for that task. That 
translation is likely performed within the dorsal stream (van Polanen & Davare 2015, 188; 
Binkofski & Buxbaum, 2013). Thus, one can coherently hold that the ventral stream influences 
motor control representations in such cases while also holding that the computations which 
determine the central feature of those representations are performed within the dorsal stream. 
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This would remain a sense in which the respective streams are dedicated to their respective 
functions, even as they interact. Such a claim is falsifiable, of course, but the point is that it is not 
undermined by the existence of non-proprietary information stores.  
Second, as argued in Chapter 1, Milner and Goodale’s hypothesis has three crucial theoretical 
implications: it controverts pre-theoretic assumptions about the role of consciousness in action 
control, it suggests a revision to ‘centralized’ conceptions of mental architecture, and it 
undermines the role of behavior in the study of conscious experience. In Chapter 1, I argued that 
these implications follow from DORSAL-CONTROL, regardless of whether the perceptual streams 
constitute isolated perceptual modules. Thus, an emphasis on modularity misleadingly suggests 
that these implications require it. 
Finally, the two streams hypothesis is widely discussed in philosophy due to its apparent 
commitment to the ‘Zombie Action Hypothesis’, the claim that the representations driving online 
motor control are unconscious. The zombie action hypothesis seems inconsistent with our pre-
theoretic judgements, which seem to hold that we use our conscious experiences in controlling 
our actions. Thus, the philosophical discussion surrounding the two streams has centered on 
whether the evidence entails the zombie action hypothesis. And the question of whether the 
evidence supports zombie action has widely been taken to be the same question as whether the 
streams are independent modules for different functions (e.g. Mole, 2009). The trouble with this 
line of thinking is that the question of modularity and the question of zombie action are not the 
same. Each can be true without the other: One might have two modular systems which each 
output conscious representations to cognition. And there could be a single system which 
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produces both conscious representations for perception and unconscious representations for 
online motor control. 
In summary, then, a modular conception of the two streams should be rejected on the grounds 
that (1) mounting empirical evidence weighs against the streams being modules, and (2) treating 
the two streams hypothesis as rising or falling with modularity conflates several different issues 
raised by Milner and Goodale’s work. Thus, we should aim for a reorientation of our theoretical 
conception of the two streams which better accords with the empirical evidence and which better 
situates the various threads of Milner and Goodale’s theory in relationship to one another. I turn 
now to developing an alternative account which can do this work. 
2.2 The Visual Streams as Mechanisms 
My aim in the next two sections is to articulate a new conception of the visual streams. That 
conception must accomplish two goals. First, it must be broadly consistent with the extant 
empirical evidence. In particular, it must be consistent, unlike the modularity account it replaces, 
with the now substantial evidence for interaction between the streams and with goings-on 
elsewhere. 
Second, on a new conception, visual streams must do meaningful explanatory and theoretical 
work in cognitive science that broadly accords with current scientific usage. Of course, a new 
account cannot completely accord with current usage, which is predominantly modularist. But a 
new account should help us understand why scientists posit visual streams where they do, and 
what utility positing such streams has in scientific theorizing. In particular, an account of the 
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visual streams should capture both the role that streams play in explaining empirical results and 
their broader role in psychological theorizing. 
I’ll take up each of these goals in turn. In this section, I’ll articulate my account and show 
that is consistent with the extant evidence. In the next section, I’ll articulate the role, on my 
account, that visual streams play in scientific theorizing, showing how it accords with the bulk of 
extant scientific practice. 
Without further ado, my account is that a visual stream is the neurally-individuable core 
mechanism for the generation of representations with a characteristic person-level functional 
role. 
The central difference between my account and the dominant one is that I claim that a visual 
stream is merely a mechanism, while the dominant one holds that a stream must be a module. 
The former is strictly weaker than the latter. The notion of a mechanism is of a set of entities and 
their activities which are organized so as to bring about a phenomenon of interest (Craver, 2007). 
The mechanism which allows me to shift gears on my bicycle, for example, is composed of 
entities — levers, cables, and derailleurs — and their activities — articulating the lever, applying 
tension to the cables, turning the primary mechanism on the derailleur, etc. — which collectively 
realize the phenomenon of interest — pulling the lever increases tension on the cables, which 
operates the derailleur, which pushes the chain up or down the gear set. 
How do we determine the underlying mechanism for a given phenomenon? First, it’s 
important to understand that mechanisms do not necessarily reflect ‘joints in nature,’ but are 
determined in part by our interests. This interest-relativity comes in at several points in the 
identification of a mechanism. In claiming that the mechanism for gear shifting is composed of 
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levers, cables, and derailleurs, for example, I begin by making a choice about a phenomenon of 
interest, whose precise specification may vary. I could ask, for example, how I shift my front 
gears versus my back gears. Or, I could ask how gear shifting works on bikes in general, rather 
than my bike. And so forth. Each of these decisions will result in different specifications of the 
underlying mechanism. 
Second, in determining the components of a mechanism, we begin by making implicit or 
explicit decisions about where the mechanism begins and ends (i.e. what its inputs and outputs 
are), and determine components against certain understood background conditions. In identifying 
the mechanism for gear shifting on my bicycle, it’s taken for granted that the bicycle has a rider, 
which moves the levers, initiating the change. We chose not to include features of the rider (such 
as the operation of their muscles and joints) in articulating the mechanism for gear shifting. We 
similarly made certain basic assumptions about the background conditions of the bike. The 
levers, cables, and derailleurs are each attached to a frame, whose stability is required for the 
mechanism’s operation. The frame’s stability is thus a background condition for the operation of 
the mechanism. 
But while decisions about inputs, outputs, and background conditions are interest-relative, 
they’re not necessarily arbitrary. The choices described above, for example, might reflect our 
interest in bicycle repair: a bicycle lacking a rider isn’t broken, and one lacking a stable frame 
has bigger problems than mere gear shifting. Similarly, mechanistic explanation in science is 
interest relative, but not necessarily arbitrary, as there may be a wide range of local constraints 
which help to identify a phenomenon of interest, where a mechanism should begin and end, or 
what its background conditions should be. Relative to these decisions, mechanistic explanation is 
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paradigmatically ‘objective’: the entities and activities which compose the mechanism are those 
which causally mediate its inputs and outputs (Craver, 2007; Prychitko, 2019). 
Importantly, while all modules are mechanisms, not all mechanisms are modules. 
Mechanisms needn’t be informationally encapsulated, since they may operate over inputs from 
outside their boundaries at one or more points in their operation. Mechanisms can share their 
representations with other operations, and thus needn’t be inaccessible. Mechanisms needn’t be 
mandatory or fast. And mechanisms needn’t be domain specific, both because a mechanism can 
itself operate over multiple domains, and because a component of a mechanism may itself 
feature in multiple mechanisms. Thus, the requirements for being a mechanism are strictly 
weaker than those of being a module. 
Nonetheless, mechanistic explanation can substantially illuminate a phenomenon of interest. 
Most relevant for our purposes, mechanistic explanation can help us understand how features of 
a mechanism’s components and their interactions (such as the representational format over which 
they operate) give rise to features of the target phenomenon (such as a target representation’s 
format). Craver (2007) argues that mechanistic explanation is the predominant form of 
explanation in contemporary neuroscience. 
The mechanism explaining gear shifting is local, in the sense that it involves a relatively 
constrained set of entities at close spatial proximity with a relatively simple set of interactions. 
But not all mechanisms are local in this way. The mechanism of climate change is widely 
distributed, involving many overlapping systems at wide spatial distribution with complex sets of 
interactions. Neural processes are paradigmatically global, in that any given mental phenomenon 
is typically underwritten by many sets of overlapping systems which interact in highly complex 
33
ways to bring about a phenomenon. It is, however, an important part of neuroscientific work to 
break up such processes into relatively local mechanisms which realize core functions. We say, 
for example, that the hippocampus is the central hub of the mechanism for episodic memory 
because the central features of episodic memory are determined by features of hippocampal 
activity (Tulving, 1983). When a relatively local mechanism explains the central features of a 
phenomenon of interest, I’ll call this the core mechanism. Thus, hippocampal activity plausibly 
constitutes the core mechanism for episodic memory. It’s important to note, however, that since 
not all phenomena are such that their central features are explainable by a single local 
mechanism, not all phenomena have a core mechanism. Plausibly, for example, visual attention 
is controlled by many sets of overlapping systems with no one local mechanism explaining the 
bulk of its central features (Knudsen, 2007). If so, then there is no core mechanism for visual 
attention. Thus, positing a core mechanism for a given phenomenon is falsifiable; and identifying 
core mechanisms is theoretically interesting. 
On the account sketched above, mechanisms are defined relative to a phenomenon of 
interest. In the case of the visual streams, the phenomenon of interest is the transformation of 
retinal stimulation into representations with certain characteristic person-level functional roles. 
In making this specification, I aim to capture the cases to which researchers have applied the 
term ‘visual stream’. Without the specification that the target representations should have person-
level functional roles, the definition would entail that there are a wide plethora of sub-personal 
visual streams: a visual stream for edge detection, one for motion detection, etc. In fact, however, 
researchers speak of streams only when a division in processing produce person-level functional 
differences. While that choice is interest-relative, I do not, again, think it is arbitrary: we have 
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special interest in streams that produce person-level representational disunity, because, as argued 
in Chapter 1, person-level representational disunity has important theoretical and methodological 
implications. 
The account sketched so far, that a visual stream is the core mechanism for the generation of 
representations with a characteristic person-level functional role, provides only individuation 
conditions for a single stream. Current usage, however, posits visual streams in multiples. The 
idea of talking about ‘the two visual streams’ is that there are at least two of them, with different 
functions. Thus, capturing usage requires that an account also provide differentiation conditions 
for multiple streams. My account claims that a core mechanism is a visual stream only if it is 
neurally isolable from some other core mechanism which independently meets the other 
conditions for being a visual stream. 
To conclude the outline of my account, then, the reason that the ventral and dorsal pathways 
constitute distinct visual streams is that (1) they each function to generate representations with a 
characteristic person-level functional role (action and cognition guidance, respectively), (2) they 
each house the core mechanism for the generation of those representations, and (3) these core 
mechanisms are neurally isolable from one another. 
Claim 1 is defended in Chapter 1. Claim 3 simply holds that the ventral and dorsal streams 
constitute different areas of cortex (that may or may not causally interact). That’s not up for 
dispute. My remaining work for this section, then, is to defend claim 2. 
Claim 2 says that the central features of the target representations are determined by goings-
on within the respective streams. This is not to say that the streams are independent or that 
goings-on elsewhere fail to constitute important inputs to the core mechanism. It’s just that 
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understanding the goings-on in each stream is the central task required to understand the target 
representation. 
Fortunately, much of the evidence discussed in the two streams literature directly supports 
this claim. Since that evidence is quite far-ranging, I’ll divide the evidence into three types — 
behavioral studies in neurotypical subjects, lesions studies, and computational analyses — and 
examine the role of that evidence in supporting claim 2. 
Let’s begin with behavioral studies in neurotypical subjects. A wide range of studies suggest 
that a number of visually-guided behaviors, such as reaching, pointing, or grasping, are less 
sensitive to certain visual illusions than is visual 
perception (Goodale and Milner, 2018; though 
see Christiansen, Christensen, Grünbaum, & 
Kyllingsbæk, 2014 and Kopiske, Bruno, Hesse, 
Schenk, & Franz, 2016). For example, the visual 
system’s tendency to determine absolute size by 
comparing an object with its surround gives rise 
to the Ebbinghaus Illusion (see Fig. 2.1), in 
which a circle surrounded by relatively small 
circles appears larger than an identical circle 
surrounded by relatively large circle. 
Aglioti et al. (1995) presented subjects with 
a 3D version of the Ebbinghaus illusion (see Fig. 
2.2), such that either (a) the center circles 
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Figure 2.1: (a) The traditional Ebbinghaus illusion. 
The center circles are the  same size, but the left 
appears larger than the right. (b) A modified illusion 
in which the center circles appear to be of  the same 
size, but are in fact different.
appeared to be of equal size, but were in fact 
different sizes or (b) the center circles appeared 
to be of different sizes, but were in fact the same 
size. They instructed subjects to pick up the right 
center circle if they believed the center circles to 
be of equal size and the left center circle if they 
believed the center circles to be of different size. 
(The order of left and right were controlled 
across blocks.) They then measured the 
maximum grip aperture of the fingers as the 
subject approached the center disc. What they found was surprising. Holding fixed the actual size 
of the center circle, the maximum grip aperture was not statistically different between trials in 
which the center circles appeared to be of identical size and those in which the center circles 
appeared to be of different size. That is, the Ebbinghaus effect appeared to have minimal 
influence on the guidance of the subject’s grip as they reached for the circle. This suggests that 
the representation driving this behavior is less sensitive to this comparative size effect than is 
conscious experience. 
The fact that visual motor guidance is relatively insensitive to comparative size is direct 
evidence for representational disunity. That is, it suggests that the representation driving visual 
motor guidance is less sensitive to the Ebbinghaus illusion than is conscious visual experience. 
Since these representations have different properties, then, it follows that they’re distinct. 
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Figure 2.2: The experimental setup from Aglioti et al. 
(1995). The subjects were presented with 3D 
versions of  the traditional (seen here) and modified 
Ebbinghaus illusions (see Fig. 2.1). In this example, 
the subject judges that the circles are of  different 
sizes, and reaches for the left center circle.
Milner and Goodale argue that it makes sense for conscious visual experiences and the 
representations guiding action to be differentially sensitive to the Ebbinghaus illusion (2006). 
Visual experiences, they suggest, must locate objects in objective space to enable flexibility to 
the location and sizes of those objects diachronically, as the egocentric relationship with those 
objects might change; it therefore makes sense that their representations of object size be highly 
sensitive to contextual information. Guidance representations, by contrast, need only enable the 
subject to locate the edges of objects in egocentric space as they guide their hand towards them; 
this task can be less sensitive to contextual cues (2006, section 6.4). 
But studies such as these do not tell us whether the behavior is produced by visuomotor 
modules. It’s of course possible that separate modules process spatial information differently in 
order to realize the kind of representational disunity suggested by Milner and Goodale. But it’s 
also possible that a highly integrated system simply creates multiple representations with 
different properties for different downstream tasks. 
One might conclude that behavioral studies like these only indicate where there is 
representational disunity, and thus tells us nothing at all about the computational features of the 
systems which generate that disunity. But that move is too quick. From these results, we know 
that the mechanism which produces the representation driving motor control must have the 
ability to relatively accurately determine the sizes of objects, even when presented with 
potentially misleading contextual information. And that in turn suggests that this mechanism 
employs a different strategy for determining distal size than does the mechanism which produces 
conscious representations. We could test different claims about this strategy using behavioral 
studies similar to this one. If, for example, the mechanism which generates guidance 
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representations estimates sizes using visual direction (that is, the direction of edges in relation to 
the eye), we should expect those representations to be less sensitive to depth cues (Linton, 2020). 
In this way, we can test claims about the computational features of the mechanisms driving 
behavior. This method is limited, however. Just as we cannot know whether the systems 
underlying this behavior are modular, we cannot know much about how they interact. Thus, we 
cannot know whether there is an isolable core mechanism for either of the respective 
representations. With respect to behavioral studies such as these, then, the modularity hypothesis 
and the core mechanism hypothesis are on par. Behavioral studies can establish an explanandum 
which could be explained by a wide variety of underlying architectures. The purpose of other 
sorts of experiments is to help determine further features of that architecture. This way of 
thinking about the role of behavioral studies in our understanding of the two streams is both 
straightforward, once articulated, and revisionary, as it suggests a division between the 
experiments confirming representational disunity from those studying underlying architecture. 
I’ll return to this point in the next section. 
A second kind of evidence discussed in the two streams literature comes from lesion studies. 
Subjects with isolated damage to either the ventral stream or the dorsal stream exhibit deficits in 
performance, giving us clues about the functional role of the lesioned area. Milner and Goodale’s 
early articulation of their model was motivated by work on patient D.F., whose isolated damage 
to the lateral occipital area of the ventral stream resulted in a condition known as ‘visual form 
agnosia’ a deficit in perceiving visual form. In a series of experiments, Goodale, Milner, 
Jakobson, and Carey (1991) compared D.F.’s performance on a visual matching task — in which 
she was asked to visually match the orientation of a card with that of a slot in front of her — with 
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her performance on a visuomotor ‘posting’ task 
— in which she physically fit the card through 
the slot. It was found that while her performance 
on the visual matching task was severely 
impaired relative to a control subject, reflecting 
a general deficit in her ability to visually 
recognize object orientations, her performance 
on the visuomotor posting task was similar to the 
control’s (see Fig. 2.3). Milner and Goodale 
conclude that D.F.’s isolated damage to the 
ventral stream results in a deficit in visual perception without a corresponding deficit in 
visuomotor control. 
Milner and Goodale compare the case of D.F. with optic ataxics, whose isolated dorsal 
stream damage results in a deficit in visuomotor control without a corresponding deficit in 
conscious experience (Milner & Goodale, 2006; for a review, see Andersen, Andersen, Hwang, 
& Hauschild, 2014). Most optic ataxics have unilateral damage to the posterior parietal lobe, 
resulting in a deficit in their ability to reach for objects in the contralesional visual field 
(Riddoch, 1935; Cole, Schutta, & Warrington, 1962; Ratcliff & Davies-Jones, 1972). This deficit 
is not explained by general damage to spatial processing, since the deficit is only contralesional. 
Nor is it explained by a deficit general to spatial perception, since the deficit is specific to a 
given effector system. That is, optic ataxics typically perform normally when directing their eyes 
toward a target (Ratcliff & Davies-Jones, 1972) or, in at least one early case, when performing 
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Figure 2.3: Polar plots reflecting the orientation of  
the cards for D.F. and a control subject in the 
perceptual matching and visuomotor posting tasks. 
From Milner and Goodale (2006), data from 
Goodale et al. (1991).
the task with an unaffected hand (Bálint, 1909). Finally, the deficit is not explained by a general 
motor disorder, as optic ataxics perform normally when pointing to objects on their body — a 
task requiring proprioception and touch, but not vision — or when pointing to objects in the 
ipsilesional visual field (Ratcliff & Davies-Jones, 1972). Thus, the deficit for optic ataxics 
appears to be a deficit in the representation for contralesional visual motor guidance. Together 
with patients like D.F., then, optic ataxics appear to establish a double dissociation between 
visual perception — which is uniquely impacted by ventral stream lesions — and visuomotor 
control — which is uniquely impacted by dorsal stream lesions. Thus, these results have been 
taken to strongly support Milner and Goodale’s functional characterization of the two streams. 
These results however, like cases of double dissociation more generally, do not confirm the 
existence of separate modules for motor guidance and conscious perception. At least two 
problems prevent that conclusion. First, visual perception and motor guidance are highly 
complex and disjunctive phenomena. Thus, it doesn’t follow from the fact, for example, that D.F. 
performs normally on one posting task that she performs normally on all visually guided motor 
tasks. In fact, she does not. Her performance is substantially worse than neurotypical controls in 
tasks involving slightly more complex shapes (Goodale et al., 1994; Carey, Harvey, & Milner, 
1996). She has trouble gripping objects ‘naturally’ (i.e. in a way that enables a comfortable grip), 
even when doing so does not involve semantic recognition of the object (Dijkerman, McIntosh, 
Schindler, Nijboer, & Milner, 2009; Dijkerman, Milner, & Carey, 1998; McIntosh, Dijkerman, 
Mon-Williams, & Milner, 2004). Whereas neurotypical subjects use a variety of cues to guide 
their actions, D.F. appears to rely exclusively on vergence angle (a binocular depth cue) and 
vertical gaze angle (i.e. visual height) when determining reach distance (Mon-Williams, 
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McIntosh, & Milner, 2001; Mon-Williams, Tresilian, McIntosh, & Milner, 2001). And she 
employs only binocular disparities and motion parallax to determine object depth for grasping 
(Dijkerman & Milner, 1998; Dijkerman, Milner, & Carey, 1998, 1999). Interfering with these 
cues results in her performing substantially worse on motor guidance tasks relative to 
neurotypical controls (see also Schenk & McIntosh, 2010). After having reviewed the now 
substantial evidence for ventral stream influence on visuomotor control, Briscoe and Schwenkler 
(2015) suggest that dorsal stream processes directly recruit ventral stream representation when 
engaged in complex or novel guidance tasks (for similar claims of direct ventral stream influence 
on dorsal stream processes, see Schenk & McIntosh, 2010 and McIntosh & Lashley, 2008). Thus, 
even if there is a double dissociation between Milner and Goodale’s perceptual matching and 
visuomotor posting tasks, there can be (and is) substantial interaction between the systems 
underlying these behaviors. 
Suppose, however, that the double dissociation did hold in lesion studies across the many 
multitudes of task-types that make up visual perception and visuomotor guidance. A second 
problem is that the inference from double dissociation to modularity is strong only when the 
relevant lesions are both complete and precise. By ‘complete,’ I mean that a lesion knocks out 
the entire region attributed to a particular task. Thus, a dorsal stream lesion is complete in this 
sense only if it affects the entirety of the dorsal stream. By ‘precise,’ I mean that a lesion renders 
inoperable only the target region. Like lesion studies generally, the cases studied in this literature 
are certainly neither complete nor fully precise (Schenk & McIntosh, 2010). And when a lesion 
is incomplete or imprecise, the possibility remains that an observed effect is underwritten either 
by the unknocked-out part of the target region or by the knocked-out part of the non-target 
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region. Thus, for example, since D.F.’s lesion knocks out only an isolated part of the ventral 
stream, it remains possible that other parts of the ventral stream help to determine her visuomotor 
performance. 
Both problems turn on the fact that modularity entails the irrelevance of non-target regions to 
a task, something lesions studies do not directly test. By contrast, a region’s being a core 
mechanism entails only the central relevance of that target region to the task, which lesion 
studies do directly test. Thus, it’s not a challenge to a core mechanism claim that different 
versions of a task recruit different regions of cortex (even regions outside the core mechanism), 
such that lesions on those areas impact performance. What matters is that lesions to the core 
mechanism are associated with more far-reaching deficits in the target task. And lesion studies 
confirm precisely that: while D.F.’s ventral stream lesion is associated, contra Milner and 
Goodale, with specific deficits in motor guidance as described above, dorsal stream lesions (such 
as those of optic ataxics) are associated with a broad ranging inability to perform visuomotor 
guidance tasks (Andersen et al., 2014). And the converse case is even clearer: while dorsal 
stream lesions are associated with certain specific impacts on perceptual experience (Schenk & 
McIntosh, 2010), lesions to the ventral stream are associated with profound impacts, including 
complete cortical blindness (Milner & Goodale, 2006). 
And while the extent of lesions remains relevant to the evidential support corresponding 
behavior gives to a core mechanism claim, the requirements are not as strict. It’s enough to 
establish positive relevance of a region to a task that that lesion be precise, i.e. not extend beyond 
the boundaries of the target region. If so, then since a deficit in performance can reasonably be 
attributed to the lesion, one can reasonably infer the relevance of that region to the task. That is, 
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since the region includes the entire lesion, we can reasonably say that at least some part of the 
region is associated with the task. Thus, it’s not important to establish positive relevance of a 
region to a task, that a lesion be complete, i.e. to encompass the entire target region. This is 
crucial, as while none of the relevant lesion cases discussed in the literature are complete, many 
of them are relatively precise (Schenk & McIntosh, 2010). Thus, lesion studies remain a useful 
indicator of core mechanisms. 
A final source of evidence for the two streams can be grouped, not by experimental 
methodology as in the last two examples, but by the kind of analysis through which experimental 
evidence is interpreted. In what I’ll call computational analysis, researchers employ particular 
theories about the functions of the streams to make predictions about the computational 
properties of those streams. These predictions are then tested using a variety of methods, 
including imaging studies (such as FMRI), knock-out and lesion studies, and so forth. 
Milner and Goodale (2006) argue that visuomotor guidance requires representational systems 
which have a relatively high temporal resolution, update frequently, are relatively coarse-grained, 
present spatial information egocentrically, and so forth. Perceptual inputs to cognition, by 
contrast, must have a high spatial resolution, enable long storage duration, locate objects in 
allocentric space, etc. These claims, along with their claim that the dorsal stream underwrites 
visuomotor guidance while the ventral stream underwrites conscious perceptions, entail 
substantive predictions about the nature of processing within the two streams. And these 
predictions contrast sharply with competitor models, such as Ungerleider and Mishkin’s (1982) 
‘what vs. where’ account. Where the latter predicts that the ventral stream is unique in processing 
information related to object identity while the dorsal stream is unique in processing spatial 
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information, Milner and Goodale’s model predicts that each stream should separately process 
both object identity and spatial information, though perhaps in different ways. 
The predictions of Milner and Goodale’s model are largely borne out by the evidence. The 
dorsal stream takes its inputs primarily from fast, but coarse-grained magno-cellular pathways in 
the LGN, while the ventral stream takes its inputs primarily from slow, but fine-grained parvo-
cellular pathways (Milner & Goodale, 2006, section 2.3). These input features, along with other 
processing features within the respective streams, appear to be responsible for relatively quick-
and-dirty outputs from the dorsal stream as compared to relatively slow-and-detailed outputs 
from the ventral stream. There is direct evidence for spatial processing within each stream, with 
retinotopic and egocentric organization persisting throughout dorsal stream processing and 
relatively retino-neutral and allocentric organization (Milner & Goodale, 2006, section 4.1). Both 
the ventral and dorsal streams appear to process information related to object identities, with the 
former processing fine-grained information required for categorization and inference and the 
latter processing relatively coarse-grained information required for navigation and manipulation 
(Milner & Goodale, 2006, section 2.5.4). Finally, as predicted by Milner and Goodale’s account, 
but not Ungerleider and Mishkin’s, the dorsal stream’s outputs are predominantly to motor 
cortices, while the ventral stream's outputs are to prefrontal regions (Milner & Goodale, 2006, 
sections 2.5 & 2.6). 
As we’ll see in the next section, computational analysis is, in my view, the core explanatory 
work to be done by an account of the visual streams. In contrast to lesion studies, computational 
analysis establishes not just that particular regions of cortex are predominantly responsible for 
the performance of certain person-level roles, but how they perform those roles. It is also 
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therefore the best evidence that the modules are core mechanisms: the received view in the 
literature, even among Milner and Goodale’s opponents, is that the central computations required 
to generate the characteristic representations of the respective streams are performed within those 
streams (e.g. Schenk & McIntosh, 2010). This is again not to say that those computations are 
isolated from goings-on outside of the streams; it is merely to say that the anatomical division 
between the ventral and dorsal streams appears to reflect a relative specialization for motor 
control and conscious perception. 
By contrast, the claim that the streams are visuomotor modules is not well supported by 
computational considerations. It’s not just that, as reviewed above, there is evidence that subjects 
with lesions to one stream have deficits in their performance on the other stream’s characteristic 
task, such as D.F.’s ventral stream damage giving rise to a deficit in certain kinds of motor tasks. 
We now have evidence for the particular way in which representations in one stream appear to 
influence computations in the other stream. Thus, for example, there is evidence that the dorsal 
stream recruits ventral stream representations to enable sensitivity to allocentric features (Schenk 
& McIntosh, 2010), pictorial depth (Schenk & McIntosh, 2010), and object identity (van Polanen 
& Davare, 2015) when engaging in tasks requiring complex fine-tuning of grasp. Such evidence 
directly undermines the claim that the streams are visuomotor modules for different purposes. 
But it simultaneously informs our understanding of the mechanisms responsible for the 
generation of conscious experiences and guidance representations respectively. It suggests, for 
example, that the dorsal stream may have to transform ventral stream object representations for 
the purposes of motor guidance (van Polanen & Davare 2015). Thus, even as such evidence 
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undermines a conception of the visual streams as modules, it enriches our understanding of the 
core mechanisms operative in the performance of their characteristic tasks. 
2.3 The Visual Streams in the Study of Perception 
I began this chapter by noting that, if the argument from Chapter 1 is correct, the central 
implications of Milner and Goodale’s model derive, not from their commitment to isolated 
perceptual processing streams, but from their commitment to representational disunity. But 
representational disunity can be realized by a variety of underlying architectures, including by 
multiple modules (as Milner and Goodale suggest), by a more centralized perceptual processing 
system (as their opponents typically maintain), or by separate core mechanisms (as I’ve now 
defended). The challenge that remains, then, is to explain why these different architectures 
matter, given that none is required for representational disunity and thus for the central 
implications. In this section, I first articulate the role that visual streams — understood as core 
mechanisms — can play in the study of perception. I then explore the implications of having 
them perform this role. Visual streams as core mechanisms, I claim, have earned their place in 
the ontology of the perceiving mind. 
In articulating an account of mechanisms, I noted that mechanistic identity is relative to a 
previously determined explanandum phenomenon. In the case of the visual streams, that 
phenomenon is the existence and features of disunified visual representations. The mechanism or 
set of mechanisms which explain this feature must explain, first, how the visual system 
transforms retinal stimulation into the set of representations that drive person-level phenomena 
such as program selection and guidance (the existence question), and, second, how those 
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transformations give rise to the characteristic features of those representations (the features 
question). It follows that on the mechanistic approach, visual streams are explanatorily secondary 
to representational disunity. That is, visual streams get their identity conditions and explanatory 
force in virtue of the downstream representations they characteristically produce. 
This picture of the role of the visual streams is in sharp contrast with the modularity 
approach. Modules do not get their identity conditions from the phenomena they explain. 
Instead, modules have their identity conditions in virtue of the set of features described at the 
beginning of Section  2.1. The most central of those conditions — informational encapsulation, 
inaccessibility, domain specificity, and so forth — are computational features of mental units. It 
follows that one can discover modules — independently of a determination of their characteristic 
outputs — by searching for mental units whose processes operate only over local information 
stores, which are inaccessible to processes outside, and so on. This independence is reflected in 
the history of the two streams literature: the existence of separate pathways of visual perception 
were posited long before researchers had precise theories about their function, and theories about 
their characteristic output have widely differed.  
Thus, on the mechanistic approach, one first discovers representations with certain features, 
and only then determines the mechanisms responsible for those representations and their 
features. But, on the modularity approach, one can — and in the case of the two streams 
literature, researchers thought they did — discover modules first, and only then discover the 
nature of the representations those modules characteristically produce. 
This difference in the order of discovery also impacts standard assumptions about the 
explananda and explanans operative in the positing of visual streams. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
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it is typically taken for granted that the central implications of the two streams account follow 
from the positing of separate visuomotor mechanisms with different functional roles. Thus, it is 
assumed that those implications follow only if the visual streams satisfy the conditions for 
modularity. But that assumption is false: the implications follow from representational disunity, 
not the strictly stronger modularity account.  
Thus, by contrast, on the picture described above, explanations come in two stages. In the 
first stage, disunified representations and their different features explain certain features of 
behavior. In the second stage, a mental architecture (such as a core mechanism) explains the 
existence and features of those disunified representations. This two-stage framework better 
tracks the dependencies between disunified representations, underlying architecture, and the 
implications of the two. 
The different frameworks also posit different explanatory roles for the three kinds of studies 
discussed in the last section. As discussed, Milner and Goodale appear to treat behavioral studies, 
lesion studies, and computational analyses as all jointly confirming the existence of separate 
visuomotor modules for different tasks. But I argued that the central implication of the 
behavioral evidence is representational disunity, which can be realized by a variety of underlying 
architectures. While lesion studies can help discover mental architectures, they’re better suited 
for discovering causal relationships between a region and phenomenon, not the informational 
isolability of that region. To discover the broader sets of interactions between a region and other 
regions, one must perform broader computational analyses on mental systems. 
In contrast to the mechanistic approach, the two-stage framework separates the discovery of 
disunified representations from the discovery of their underlying architecture. It can thus better 
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capture the evidential role of the three kinds of study. That is, on my account, the primary role of 
behavioral evidence is to help discover disunified representations. The role of lesion studies is to 
determine the causal relevance of neural regions to those representations (and thus to discover 
which regions are components of the mechanism for those representations). And the role of 
computational analyses is to discover how different regions interact in order to produce those 
representations (and thus to discover whether those representations are constituted by unified 
systems, modules, or separable core mechanisms).  
Thus, I think the two-stage project employed in the mechanistic approach has clear 
advantages over the project typified in the modularist approach. I’ll finish my discussion by 
highlighting three sorts of meaningful explanatory work that is accomplished by the mechanistic 
approach. This work, I believe, enables the mechanistic notion of streams to earn its place in our 
mental ontology. 
First, positing core mechanisms enables us to explain and predict the existence and features 
of disunified representations. Core mechanisms explain the existence and features of disunified 
representation because, as described above, to discover a mechanism is to discover the entities 
and activities which causally mediate a phenomenon’s inputs and outputs. In this case, the 
relevant outputs are representations with certain features (including functional features) and the 
inputs are paradigmatically retinal stimulation. Thus, the relevant mechanism is the set of causal 
factors which explain how retinal stimulation is transformed into those representations. This set 
of causes explains both how the representations come to exist and why they have the features 
they do. Thus, for example, if — as Milner and Goodale contend — dorsal stream processes 
operate over egocentrically formatted representations, then this fact can explain the spatial 
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format of action-guidance representations (which, Milner and Goodale also contend, are 
themselves egocentrically formatted). And in addition to explaining the features of disunified 
representations, knowing the mechanism which causes those representations can enable us to 
predict some of their features. Thus, to reverse the preceding case, if we antecedently knew that 
dorsal stream processes operate over egocentrically formatted representations, we could 
justifiably predict that guidance representations are also egocentrically formatted. 
The preceding points are true of mechanistic explanation generally. What additional 
explanatory work is achieved by positing a neurally individuable core mechanism for disunified 
representations? Recall that a core mechanism is the local mechanism which explains the central 
features of a target phenomenon. Thus, when the core mechanisms for different representations 
are neurally individuable, we know that the central features of those representations are 
determined by separate processing units. This does not entail the positive claim that the 
representation and their causes can be studied in isolation, as might be entailed by modularity. 
But it does entail the negative claim that we cannot make direct inferences from one 
representation (or its causes) to the other representation (or its causes). Thus, if disunified 
representations are determined by neurally individuable core mechanisms, then we must be 
cautious when drawing inferences about, for example, visual perception generally. 
Second, positing visual streams as core mechanisms has important architectural implications. 
Specifically, the notion of visual streams developed above retains the idea that the visual system 
divides and conquers, employing separate perceptual processing streams for separate functions. 
You might doubt this implication on the grounds that the requirements of core mechanisms are 
weaker, and thus more architecturally neutral, than those of modularity. As I pointed out above, 
51
the claim that the visual streams constitute neurally isolable core mechanisms is neutral between 
with the claim that those streams are in fact modules (as the latter is just a kind of core 
mechanism) and the claim that the streams are part of a highly interconnected processing system 
(as in fact seems likely of the visual streams). Given this neutrality, one might doubt the 
architectural implications of positing core mechanisms. 
But this places too high a bar on the discovery of mental architecture. As I suggested when 
developing the mechanistic account, neural processes are paradigmatically global, in that any 
given mental phenomenon is typically underwritten by many sets of overlapping systems which 
interact in endlessly complex ways to bring about a phenomenon. Even if there are mental 
modules, it’s an important aspect of neuroscientific work that we break down highly integrated 
systems into relatively local mechanisms which realize core functions. Thus, the discovery of 
neurally isolable core mechanisms for separate roles is an important part of the discovery of 
mental architecture. Put another way, to say, for example, that the dorsal stream is the core 
mechanism for the generation of guidance representations is on par with saying that the 
hippocampus constitutes the core mechanism for episodic memory. Both mechanisms are of 
course widely integrated with systems outside. But they remain important architectural findings 
in the study of their respective phenomena. 
Finally, in addition to allowing us to explain and predict features of disunified representations 
in virtue of features of core mechanisms, knowing that a set of processes constitute a core 
mechanism can enable us to explain and predict features of its internal computations. That is, for 
example, Milner and Goodale argue that program guidance is assisted by processes that are 
quick, coarse grained, have an egocentric format, and so on. This contention, along with the 
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claim that the dorsal stream constitutes the core mechanism for guidance representations, entails 
positive predictions about the goings on within the dorsal stream: namely, we can expect dorsal 
stream processes to have these features. In this respect, the positing of neurally-isolable core 
mechanisms does similar work to Milner and Goodale’s positing of separate visuomotor 
modules: it allows us to make predictions about the different computational features of different 
streams. This in turn helps guide researchers. 
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Chapter 3: The Function of Functional Division 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the features that makes cognitive science a science is its insistence on decomposition. The 
mind is not a uniform input-output machine, but rather a collection of discrete states, processes, 
and systems which collectively determine our mental lives. Therefore, one of the central tasks of 
cognitive science is to describe the functions of discrete mental units. These functional 
descriptions can come in two broad forms. Local functional descriptions characterize the central 
tasks of a mental unit and the internal operations which realize that performance. Global 
functional descriptions characterize, of a collection of mental units, how they interact in order to 
realize mental phenomena. 
Local and global functional descriptions are distinct, but tightly related, such that each is 
incomplete without the other. Failing to attend to both local and global questions leads us to miss 
things. Loosely speaking, the local function of a corner store is to sell food and other home 
goods. But when attending to the global function of home goods stores more generally, we see 
that corner stores are one of many kinds of stores which employ different strategies to deliver 
home goods to customers. This explains why corner stores carry Twinkies, but not produce, and 
cleaning solution, but not mops. Thus, attending to the global function of home goods stores 
causes us to refine our characterization of the local function of corner stores. 
Some functional questions can only be asked globally, that is, of suites of discrete units. We 
might ask, for example, what broader role the division between corner stores, groceries, and 
hardware stores plays in the sale of home goods. Why not just have a single store that carries 
everything? The answer is (approximately) that the distinction between groceries and hardware 
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stores allows for the concentration of resources and expertise according to distinct needs, while 
the distinction between these two and corner stores broadens both speed and access. This answer 
forces us to further refine our characterization of the local function of corner stores. 
Like the home goods market, the visual system is subdivided into discrete units with distinct 
local functions. Much of this division is what we might call sub-personal: there’s a visual unit for 
motion detection, edge and object detection, color, and so forth. These units coordinate in the 
production of broadly unified visual experiences, each containing components processed in these 
various units. But the visual system is also divided according to person-level local functions. On 
the dominant accounts, the cortical visual system is divided into a ventral stream processing 
‘vision for perception’ and a dorsal stream processing ‘vision for action’ (Milner & Goodale, 
2006), while the subcortical visual system is divided into a ‘low road’ for rapid threat detection 
and response and a ‘high road’ which outputs to the cortical system (Tamietto & De Gelder, 
2010). 
This division in person-level local functions raises a higher-order global question: what is the 
function of this functional division? Why does the visual system divide and conquer rather than 
unite and build? On the dominant account, designed to explain the functional division between 
the ventral and dorsal streams, the division between visual streams is similar to the division 
between groceries and hardware stores: it allows for the concentration of resources and expertise 
according to distinct needs. That is, perception and motor control place conflicting demands on 
the computational systems that determine them, and adequately meeting those demands is best 
accomplished with a divide and conquer strategy (Milner & Goodale, 2006). I’ll call this view 
“task-based division.” In their critique of this model, Briscoe and Schwenkler (2015) suggest an 
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alternative, apparently deflationary, account according to which the division is more like that 
between groceries and corner stores: both the ventral and dorsal streams are ultimately engaged 
in action guidance, but the ventral stream is slow and deliberate while the dorsal stream is quick 
and automatic. I’ll call this view “computational division.” 
My aim in this chapter is to defend a new account of the function of functional division 
which is intermediate between task-based division and computational division. The function of 
functional division is to allow, for each task, a division between task-specific and task-general 
processing strategies, optimizing performance. In the next two sections, I consider and ultimately 
reject task-based and computational division, respectively. Because multiple streams participate 
in the performance of their proposed person-level tasks, the function of functional division is not 
simply, as Milner and Goodale propose, to assist in the performance of downstream tasks with 
conflicting demands (Section 3.2). And because some streams are largely dedicated to the 
performance of particular downstream tasks, the function of functional division is not simply, as 
Briscoe and Schwenkler suggest, to realize different computational strategies in response to the 
same sorts of tasks (Section 3.3). 
In Section 3.4, I propose my new view. I argue that, to realize their computational 
advantages, automatic processing systems organize around particular person-level tasks while 
deliberate ones are task neutral. Thus, realizing the benefits of multiple computational strategies 
requires a fundamental division between what I call ‘task-coupled’ and ‘task-decoupled’ 
processing systems. Such a division explains the empirical findings that challenge task-based and 
computational division. 
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3.2 Task-based Division 
In this section I’ll present Milner and Goodale’s (2006) account of the function of functional 
division, which I’ll call ‘task-based division’, and argue that it is inconsistent with the empirical 
evidence. 
3.2.1. Local Functions 
Neuroscientists have long posited a division in the cortical visual system between the ventral and 
dorsal streams. I mentioned above that on Milner and Goodale’s (2006) account, the ventral 
stream has the function of processing vision for perception while the dorsal stream has the 
function of processing vision for action. By ‘vision for perception,’ they mean the set of 
representations (and upstream processing) which are operative in (largely conscious) cognitive 
activity, such as conscious visual report. By ‘vision for action,’ they mean the set of 
representations and processes which are operative in in-the-moment visual motor guidance, such 
as the visual guidance of the hand when reaching for an object. 
To help explain the broader functional role of such a division, they draw an analogy to the 
guidance of a hypothetical martian rover (Goodale & Milner, 2004). The rover’s job is to 
navigate the martian terrain and collect samples. To accomplish these goals, the rover is fitted 
with communication equipment which allows remote control of its overall behavior from Earth. 
To determine the rover’s action plan, mission control determines what the rover’s sensors tell us 
about the rover’s nearby environment and sends an action program describing what it should do 
next. But since there is substantial delay between Earth and Mars, it would be inadvisable for the 
rover to simply execute precise movements on the basis of mission control’s action program. 
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Rather, the rover should update the program in response to in-the-moment conditions. Thus, the 
rover is fitted with an additional onboard system which independently assesses the scene and 
makes fine-grained adjustments to the action program. If a rock blows in the way, it can navigate 
around it; when picking up samples, it can use its sensors in-the-moment to guide its limbs 
toward the target; and so forth. The overall behavior of the rover is thus controlled by two 
systems, a smart but slow controller system which selects action programs for the rover, and a 
crude but quick onboard system which guides the fine-grained execution of those programs. 
Milner and Goodale propose that a similar functional division exists in the cortical visual 
system. The ventral stream outputs to a broad-functioning cognitive system, enabling smart but 
slow selection of action programs; and the dorsal stream outputs directly to action systems to 
enable dumb but quick guidance of those programs. If, for example, I aim to catch a ball hit into 
the outfield, ventral stream information is employed in determining what to do and roughly how 
to do it. I assess the trajectory of the ball, see that it is headed toward my part of the field, and 
make a rough estimate of where I need to move my body and arm to intercept it. Thus, the 
ventral stream and downstream cognitive activity are analogous to the Martian rover’s controller 
system. But the action program selected by cognition is itself vague; roughly, cognition’s output 
is a set of conditional motor commands. The dorsal stream’s role, analogous to the Martian 
rover’s onboard system, is to supply ‘online’ the antecedents of those conditionals. As the ball 
arcs, I move my body in order to keep a constant angle between the horizon and the ball, 
ensuring that I arrive at the bottom of the arc, and so forth. The ventral stream and cognition 
determine what to do and the dorsal stream rapidly updates action systems about how to do it. In 
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keeping with the rover analogy, I’ll refer to these two tasks as program ‘selection’ and program 
‘guidance’. 
In what follows, I’ll assume that these local functional claims are largely correct; that is, that 
the division between the ventral and dorsal streams roughly corresponds to a division in 
processing between vision for perception and vision for action. My defense of that model is not 
complete, however, and it’s worth clarifying my commitments by responding to two kinds of 
evidence which have been raised against the model. Specifically, on Milner and Goodale’s 
preferred interpretation, the ventral and dorsal streams constitute isolated perceptual processing 
systems, each with a proprietary function. But each of these claims is challenged in the empirical 
literature. First, evidence from neuroanatomical studies reveal substantial connectivity between 
the ventral and dorsal streams (van Polanen & Davare, 2015; Cloutman, 2013; Grafton, 2010) 
which likely results in computation-level interaction between them (Schenk & McIntosh, 2010). 
Such evidence undermines Milner and Goodale’s contention that the ventral and dorsal streams 
constitute isolated perceptual processing systems. Second, Milner and Goodale’s contention that 
each stream performs a proprietary function (of program selection or guidance respectively) is 
undermined by evidence for direct dorsal stream influence on conscious experience (Michel & 
Henaff, 2004; Perenin & Vighetto, 1988; Pisella et al., 2009; Striemer et al., 2007, Striemer, 
Chapman, & Goodale, 2009; Striemer et al., 2009; van Polanen & Davare, 2015) and for direct 
ventral stream involvement in online motor control (Goodale et al., 1994; McIntosh & Lashley, 
2008; Schenk & McIntosh, 2010; Briscoe & Schwenkler, 2015). 
As argued in Chapter 1, neither interconnectivity between the streams nor failure of 
proprietary function undermine the central tenet of Milner and Goodale’s proposal, which is that 
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dorsal stream representations exhibit direct control on online motor activity, without further 
cognitive intermediaries. This claim is both novel and surprising, since it undermines a picture of 
the perceiving mind according to which perceptual systems function as inputs to cognition, 
which then does the heavy lifting in determining our actions. More generally, as argued in 
Chapter 2, the claim of broad functional division between the streams—that is, that the dorsal 
stream is largely organized around program guidance while the ventral stream is largely 
organized around broader cognitive guidance, and that the relevant representations driving those 
activities are located within those respective streams—is consistent with cross-talk between the 
two streams, and with partial overlap in their functional roles. As Schenk and McIntosh (2010) 
put it in their review of evidence against fully isolated perceptual processing streams: “the 
perception-action model captures some broad patterns of functional localization, but… the 
specializations of the two streams are relative, not absolute.” 
Once we’ve posited multiple streams of visual processing, it’s reasonable to ask: how many 
streams are there? Some researchers building connectivity models of the visual system have 
proposed that the cortical visual system’s topology divides beyond the two visual streams (e.g. 
Haak & Beckmann 2018). But in Chapter 2, I argued that we should individuate perceptual 
streams according to the person-level functions their representations primarily subserve. Thus, 
since not all divisions in processing necessarily entail person-level functional differences, such 
topological studies do not suffice to establish further visual streams. 
Researchers studying the subcortical visual system, however, have proposed a division in 
processing between ‘low’ and ‘high’ roads of visual processing. The high road functions to 
transport visual information from the retina to the visual cortices (and thus, eventually, along the 
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two visual streams). It thus lacks a distinctive person-level function. But the low-road—which is 
constituted by direct projections from the thalamus (an early ‘way station’ in visual processing) 
to the early amygdala (which is associated with fear processing—is thought to directly trigger 
rapid ‘fight or flight’ responses to threatening stimuli. These responses include broader 
anticipatory responses — such as up regulating cortisol production (van Honk et al., 1998) — 
but also include overt behaviors — such as freezing or fleeing (Hamm et al., 2003). The latter is 
an example of program selection, a paradigm person-level task. Thus, it’s plausible that the low-
road constitutes a third visual stream. As we’ll see, one of my objections to task-based division 
relies in part on the widely accepted claim that the low-road exists and is independently 
responsible for triggering a select class of ‘fight or flight’ action programs. 
3.2.2. Global Functions 
While the idea of a division between the ventral and dorsal streams is old, the role this division 
plays in visual processing has long been debated. According to Mishkin and Ungerleider’s 
(1982) earlier account, the ventral stream has the function of determining the ‘qualities’ of 
objects in the visual scene while the dorsal stream has the function of determining the locations 
of those objects. In slogan form, the ventral stream is the ‘what’ pathway while the dorsal stream 
is the ‘where’ pathway. Milner and Goodale’s (2006) account of the division—on which the 
division between the ventral and dorsal stream functions to accomplish separate downstream 
tasks, rather than process different distal features—has largely supplanted Mishkin and 
Ungerleider’s. Key evidence against the latter includes evidence for separate object and spatial 
representations present in each stream (Milner & Goodale, 2006). If each stream relies on its 
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own object and spatial representations, then the division between the ventral and dorsal streams 
cannot be explained by a division between ‘what’ and ‘where’ processing.  
I bring up this earlier model to make a different point, however: In providing an account of 
the local function of the two streams, Ungerleider and Mishkin’s account makes harder the 
global question of what purpose such functional division has in the first place. Other divisions in 
the processing of distal features—such as between motion and color processing in early vision—
are common throughout the visual system. In those cases, however, distal features are processed 
separately but in close spatial proximity. This proximity enables rapid cross-talk when 
determining the distal features with related contents. And it makes sense given the eventual aim 
of producing a unified representation of the distal scene. But both of these features are also true 
of ‘what’ and ‘where’ information, since, for example, information about spatial relationships can 
inform our understanding of object identity and since our visual experiences clearly contain 
unified representations of objects and their spatial relationship. Why, then, should ‘what’ and 
‘where’ information be processed in such disparate regions of cortex when other divisions are 
not? No clear answer is forthcoming. The failure of the Ungerleider and Mishkin model thus 
highlights the importance of attending simultaneously to both local and global functional 
questions. 
Milner and Goodale (2006) propose a task-based division in processing between the ventral 
and dorsal streams. The ventral stream outputs to a broad-functioning cognitive system, enabling 
smart but slow selection of action programs; and the dorsal stream outputs directly to action 
systems to enable dumb but quick guidance of those programs. This is their account of the local 
function of the two visual streams. Unlike Ungerleider and Mishkin, Milner and Goodale also 
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attend to global functional questions about the broader function of this functional division. They 
argue that flexible program selection and rapid program guidance place conflicting demands on 
the computational demands that underly them. Thus, adequate performance on both tasks 
requires a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy. 
They highlight several demand conflicts between selection and guidance (Milner & Goodale, 
2006). First, rapid program guidance requires high temporal resolution while flexible program 
selection requires high spatial resolution. To catch a falling pen, for example, the representations 
guiding my hand toward the target must be rapidly updated in the moment, allowing me to 
constantly update the trajectory of my arm as the pen falls. By contrast, determining the identity 
of an acquaintance (an aspect of program selection) requires attention to fine-grained details of 
their face. But speed and detail place conflicting demands on computational systems: the faster 
the processing, the less fine-grained detail can be sussed out; the more detail, the longer it takes 
to process. 
Second, flexible program selection requires long storage duration, while rapid program 
guidance requires rapid updating. To decide which button to press in the elevator, for example, I 
need to know which button it was appropriate to press last time. Thus, the system responsible for 
selection must have access to long-stored contents. By contrast, when reaching for the falling 
pen, the precise angle between my arm and the pen matters a great deal in the moment, but not at 
all a few milliseconds later. The representations guiding my hand, therefore, must update in-the-
moment. Since storage requires resources, and since rewriting stored representations takes time 
and energy, long storage duration and rapid updating place conflicting demands on 
computational systems. 
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Third, flexible selection is best performed from within an allocentric (object-centered) spatial 
frame, while rapid guidance is best performed from within an egocentric (agent-centered) spatial 
frame. To decide where to look for my keys, for example, what matters is the location of those 
keys in objective space (e.g. on the table), not the relative position of the keys to me the last time 
I saw them (e.g. to my left). By contrast, when grabbing for the falling pen, just the opposite 
features matter: it doesn’t matter where the pen is in objective space, it only matters where the 
pen is with respect to me. Thus, since allocentric and egocentric spatial frames are different, and 
since translating between them requires time and resources, this too is a conflicting demand 
between guidance and selection. 
Finally, the particular contents required for selection and guidance often differ. In deciding 
whether to reach for a mug, for example, particular facts about the identity of that mug (e.g. that 
it’s my ‘I should be writing’ mug) are crucially important. By contrast, when actually reaching 
for the mug, what matters are precise distances, joint angles, etc. Since computational resources 
are not infinite, and since computing over more contents requires greater resources and time, 
these different contents also place conflicting demands on the computational systems that 
determine them. 
Since the demands of the two tasks conflict, a single resource-limited system would be 
forced to make tradeoffs; favoring either the speed, storage, spatial format, or contents of one 
other other task, at the cost of the other. A divided system, on the other hand, can allocate 
separate processing resources to each task, optimizing overall performance. Thus, not only are 
the local functional claims of Milner and Goodale’s model borne out by the evidence (they 
argue), this functional division itself makes computational sense. And the latter global functional 
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claim entails positive predictions: we should expect the dorsal stream—which is responsible for 
program guidance—to process stimuli rapidly, to store representations for a relatively short 
duration, to encode information in an egocentric spatial frame, and to be responsive to contents 
which are specific to the guidance task. And we should expect the ventral stream—which is 
responsible for program selection—to process stimuli relatively more slowly, with more detail 
and tagging, to enable longer-term storage of its representations, to encode information in an 
allocentric spatial frame, and to process contents which are relative to program selection. Thirty 
years of neuroscientific research largely confirms these various predictions (Milner & Goodale, 
2006). 
3.2.3. Two Empirical Challenges to Task-Based Division 
I’ll now articulate two empirical challenges for task-based division as an account of the function 
of functional division, multi-stream guidance and multi-stream selection. In section 3.2.1, I 
rehearsed arguments from previous chapters that evidence of non-proprietary functions is 
consistent with Milner and Goodale’s local functional claims. In this section, I must therefore 
establish why this same evidence nonetheless challenges their account of the global function of 
functional division. As we’ll see, both multi-stream guidance and multi-stream selection raise the 
same basic issue for the task-based account: if multiple visual streams with different 
computational profiles engage in the same basic task (guidance or selection, respectively), then 
the function of that division cannot be as simple as a difference in the computational demands of 
those tasks. That is, the empirical evidence now suggests that each of these tasks is carried out 
using a complex of computational approaches. And a global functional account should explain 
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why this is so. Task-based division is structurally 
incapable of providing such an explanation. 
Multi-stream Guidance 
The first challenge is multi-stream guidance. While 
early legion studies suggested that the dorsal stream 
was uniquely involved in online motor control, 
increasing evidence suggests that the ventral stream is 
also involved in the guidance of tasks with sufficient 
complexity. 
Consider the experiment mentioned in Ch. 2 in which D.F. was asked to both perceptually 
match the angle of a slot and to post a disc through that slot. In the simplest version in which the 
slot was a straight line, the results matched the predictions of Milner and Goodale’s model: D.F. 
was unable to accurately match the angle of that slot, but surprisingly adept at posting the disc 
through that slot. See Fig. 3.1. 
In a subsequent experiment, however, Goodale et al. 
(1994) asked D.F. to fit a T-shaped disc through a T-
shaped slot, a more complicated task (Fig. 3.2). They 
found that D.F. could perform this task on only about 
half of the trials, and she was generally off by about 90 
degrees on unsuccessful trials (Fig 3.3). These findings, 
combined with the above, suggest that dorsal stream 
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Figure 3.1: Polar plots reflecting the 
orientation of  the cards for D.F. and a 
control subject in the perceptual matching 
and visuomotor posting tasks. From Milner 
and Goodale (2006), data from Goodale et 
al. (1991).
Figure 3.2: From Goodale et al. (1994), a 
representation of  the T-shaped posting task.
representations may drive motor guidance in relatively 
simple aspects of certain tasks (such as navigating the 
hand around edges), but that ventral stream 
representations may be involved in the guidance of 
more complex tasks (such as combining edges into 
complex object representations). For further such cases, 
see reviews from McIntosh and Lashley (2008) and 
Schenk and McIntosh (2010). Drawing on such 
evidence, Briscoe and Schwenkler (2015) have 
suggested a kind of dual-systems account of the role of the ventral and dorsal streams in 
perceptual motor control: the dorsal stream is responsible for the direct control of easy, familiar 
aspects of tasks, but heavily recruits ventral stream representations in executing novel or difficult 
motor commands. 
Such evidence problematizes task-based division. If there are multiple streams — which by 
hypothesis have different computational profiles — involved in program guidance, then the 
separation between the ventral and dorsal streams cannot be justified simply by a difference in 
the computational requirements of guidance and selection respectively. That is, while task-based 
division might explain the primary role of the dorsal stream in program guidance, it leaves 
unexplained the occasional role of the ventral stream in that guidance. What we should want is 
an account of the function of functional division that helps us both understand why the ventral 
stream is involved in motor guidance and predict when this should be so. Task-based division is 
structurally incapable of doing this. 
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Figure 3.3: From Goodale et al. (1994), polar 
plots reflecting the final orientation in the T-
shaped posting task.
Multi-stream Selection 
The problem of multi-stream selection is structurally identical to the problem of multi-stream 
guidance: if there are multiple streams with different computational profiles performing the role 
of program selection, then the separation between the streams cannot be justified simply by the 
conflicting computational demands of selection and guidance. 
On the received model, central cognition selects action programs on the basis of (largely 
conscious) perceptual representations. Thus, multi-stream selection holds if there are multiple 
streams involved in the formation of those perceptual representations. As mentioned in 2.1, there 
is now evidence for dorsal stream influence both on perception’s object representations and 
conscious attentional control (Schenk & McIntosh, 2010). And philosophers have further 
proposed the dorsal stream influences perception’s spatial format (Wu, 2014) and ‘feeling of 
presence’ (Matthen, 2005). If such influences exist, then it’s plausible that dorsal stream 
processes are at least partially responsible for program selection. Thus, since the ventral stream is 
also implicated in the formation of the perceptual representations that guide program selection, 
such influences suggest multi-stream selection. 
However, this case of multi-stream selection has two crucial limitations. First, while there is 
direct evidence for dorsal stream influence on ventral stream representations, substantive 
influences on either perceptual experience or program selection are largely speculative. That is, 
studies are not yet refined enough to establish a clear connection between dorsal stream 
processes and distinctively perceptual performance. Second, even if we grant a substantive 
influence of dorsal stream processes on perceptual representations—and not just pre-perceptual 
ones—any suggested influence on program selection is necessarily via those perceptual 
73
representations. That is, the suggested model is one on which both the ventral and dorsal streams 
contribute to a unified perceptual representation which is employed in the selection of action 
programs. A stronger case for multi-stream selection would posit independent influence. 
In looking for a program selection stream that challenges task-based division, then, we are 
looking for four properties. First, of course, the stream must be separate from the ventral stream. 
Second, it must uncontroversially engage in program selection. That means that the stream must 
be operative in choosing the broad course of a token behavior, rather than the mere operational 
details of that behavior. Third, it should engage in program selection independently of ventral 
stream processes. That is, the strongest case against task-based division will be made if there are 
multiple streams which determine action programs, not merely a separate stream which 
influences the ventral stream and downstream cognition in that determination. Fourth, to best 
undermine the claim of computational division between tasks, it would be best if the stream had 
a very different set of computational features from the ventral stream. Thus, where the latter is 
slow, deliberate, and detailed, the target stream should be quick, automatic, and coarse grained. 
We find each of these features in the ‘low-road’ of the subcortical visual system. First, the 
low-road—which extends from the thalamus to the amygdala, bypassing the visual cortex 
altogether—is separate from the ventral stream (Tamietto & De Gelder, 2010). Second, since the 
low-road is responsible for triggering rapid ‘fight or flight’ responses to threatening stimuli, it is 
responsible for determining the broad course of behavior, rather than mere operational details 
(Hamm et al., 2003). Third, the low-road performs this role directly and independently of ventral 
stream involvement. This independence can be seen, for example, in the speed of low-road 
processes, which execute well before ventral stream involvement (Tamietto et al., 2009). Finally, 
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as this speed suggests, low-road processes have very different computational features from 
ventral stream ones. Low-road representations are much coarser-grained than ventral stream 
ones, allowing for rapid and automatic responses to broad patterns in the visual scene 
(Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2003). Such processing is in sharp contrast to the 
detailed, deliberate, and slow execution of ventral stream selection. 
Thus, while the dorsal stream may be involved in the selection of action programs, the low-
road of visual processing presents a stronger challenge to task-based division from multi-stream 
selection. If the low-road of visual processing independently selects action programs, despite its 
very different computational profile from the ventral stream, then the separation between streams 
cannot be justified by a difference in the computational requirements of guidance and selection 
respectively. Indeed, the evidence above suggests that the computational features of the low-road 
are more akin to the dorsal stream than the ventral stream. Thus, while task-based division might 
explain the primary role of the ventral stream in program selection, it leaves unexplained the role 
of the low-road in selection. What we should want is an account of the function of functional 
division that helps us both understand why the low road is involved in program selection and 
predict when this should be so. Task-based division is structurally incapable of doing this. 
3.3 Computational Division 
Briscoe and Schwenkler (2015) draw on evidence for multi-stream guidance to argue for a new 
view about the relationship between the ventral and dorsal streams in the guidance of online 
motor activity. On their view, dorsal stream processes are, as Milner and Goodale contend, 
primarily responsible for the relatively automatic control of familiar or easy aspects of action 
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tasks, but, contra Milner and Goodale, the ventral stream is heavily recruited in the guidance of 
tasks which are unfamiliar or difficult. Briscoe and Schwenkler appear to hold, as I’ve suggested 
above, that this conclusion is broadly consistent with Milner and Goodale’s local functional 
characterization of the dorsal stream — as it maintains that the dorsal stream is organized around 
program guidance — but inconsistent with their global functional characterization of the 
relationship between the streams — as it precludes a sharp division in streams between program 
selection and guidance. 
Briscoe and Schwenkler’s aim is to defend the ‘Control Thesis’ that “spatial representational 
contents of visual experience are sometimes used to control actions directed at objects in the 
surrounding environment” (2015, 1436). Thus, their primary interest is in the local function of 
ventral stream processes in online motor control. And they stop short of offering an explicit 
account of the global function of the division between the ventral and dorsal streams. But their 
arguments are suggestive of an account, which I’ll call “computational division,” the view that 
the functional division between the ventral and dorsal streams is primarily one of computational 
profile. That is, the dorsal stream (and perhaps the low-road) is engaged in the relatively 
automatic control of the familiar and easy aspects of visuomotor tasks while the ventral stream is 
engaged in the more deliberate control of unfamiliar or difficult aspects of those tasks. I’ll refrain 
from attributing this view to Briscoe and Schwenkler, since they don’t articulate it, but the 
similarity between the view they seem to hold and the one defended here deserves note. My aim 
in this section is to show that computational division addresses many of the shortcomings of 
task-based division. 
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Computational division denies any central division in streams between downstream person-
level tasks. Instead, it holds that the function of functional division between the visual streams is 
to allow for multiple computational approaches to be enacted in response to the same 
downstream tasks. That is, the ventral stream and downstream cognition enact a deliberate, slow, 
and intelligent computational approach while the dorsal stream and the low road enact a more 
automatic, quick, and dirty approach. The emphasis here is on automaticity versus non-
automaticity, with speed and detail as implications. Thus, the claim is that we have one 
perception/action system (the ventral stream plus cognition) which has a deliberate (non-
automatic) computational profile and other perception/action systems (the dorsal stream and the 
low road) which have automatic computational profiles. The function of functional division is to 
allow the enactment of both deliberate and automatic computations toward the same person-level 
tasks. 
To evaluate the plausibility of this account, it will help to clarify what we mean by 
‘automaticity’. As Ben Phillips has pointed out (2021, manuscript), saying that a process is 
automatic is vague between saying that that process is mandatory, ballistic, autonomous, or some 
combination thereof. A process is mandatory just in case its triggering conditions entails 
execution of the process. Unfortunately, for example, given my cooking skills, my smoke 
detector is mandatory, such that a certain concentration of smoke in the air immediately triggers 
a building-wide alarm. I’ll say that a process is optional if it is not mandatory. A process is 
ballistic just in case, once initiated, the process will necessarily run to completion. Also 
unfortunately, since I often leave out a shirt, my washing machine is ballistic, since it locks upon 
initiation, preventing alteration until the cycle is complete. I’ll say that a process is interruptible 
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if it is not ballistic. Finally, a process is autonomous just in case, once initiated, its internal 
operations do not require input from outside. Happily, my water kettle is autonomous, as, once 
initiated, it automatically brings water to a boil, without requiring further outside input. I’ll say 
that a process is integrated if it’s not autonomous. 
The three notions are each relative in the sense that they hold only under certain descriptions 
of the relevant process. An optional process, for example, is such that multiple independent 
conditions determine whether the process initiates. But if these inputs are grouped together into 
broader initiation conditions, then the process is mandatory relative to those conditions. My 
smart thermostat, for example, will turn on the heater if the room temperature falls below a 
certain setting, but only if my phone is at home. One might say, then, that this thermostat’s 
operation is optional, since it can decide whether to run or not depending on whether I’m at 
home. Or one could say that its operation is mandatory, since the condition [temperature below 
setting + Ben’s phone is at home] necessarily triggers the heater. Which description is more 
appropriate depends on one’s interests. Moreover, a process is typically mandatory, ballistic, or 
autonomous only relative to a set of background conditions. My kettle is autonomous, for 
example, but only if it’s plugged in. Finally, it’s plausible that each of the three notions come in 
degrees. My smart thermostat, for example, is more optional than a regular thermostat, but less 
optional than if I were simply flipping the heater on and off when I wanted to. We might be able 
to precisify this gradation by appeal to the number of degrees of freedom present in each case. 
That is, my smart thermostat is more optional than a regular one because more conditions must 
be fixed to determine whether its operation is triggered. 
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With these clarifications aside we can now get clearer on the predictions of computational 
division. On that account, the perception/action streams composed of the ventral stream plus 
cognition on the one hand and the dorsal stream and the low road on the other differ primarily in 
their functional profiles. The ventral stream plus cognition is broadly deliberate (optional, 
interruptible, and integrated) while the dorsal stream and the low road are broadly automatic 
(mandatory, ballistic, and autonomous). These predictions are borne out by the evidence. 
The claim that the ventral stream’s influence on action is relatively deliberate is 
approximately axiomatic.  It’s widely agreed that the ventral stream’s central outputs are to 1
cognition. This explains, for example, the neuroanatomical fact that ventral stream’s efferent 
connections are primarily with prefrontal cortices and the fact that only subjects with intact 
ventral streams can perform normally on visual judgment tasks (Milner & Goodale, 2006; 
Goodale & Milner, 2018). And it is a near conceptual truth that cognitive operations are 
deliberate, in the sense that they are optional, interruptible, and integrated.  Cognitive operations 2
are optional, in the sense that, relative to a given stimulus, multiple downstream actions are 
available. They’re interruptible, in the sense that cognition can (at least typically) cancel 
operations or actions it initiates. And its operations are at least broadly integrated with one 
another. Since it is broadly agreed that ventral stream influences on action are primarily (or 
perhaps always) via cognition, it follows that the ventral stream’s influence is deliberate. 
 This claim should be distinguished from the claim that ventral stream operations are themselves deliberate, such 1
that, for example, we could simply turn on or off visual face detection. That claim is demonstrably false (e.g. 
Caldara & Seghier, 2009). The claim here is simply that the ventral stream’s influence on action is relatively 
deliberate, in virtue of its cognitive intermediaries. 
 The claim is that cognition’s overall operation is relatively deliberate, in the sense that it is optional, interruptible, 2
and integrated. This is of course consistent with the fact that some cognitive operations are less deliberate and more 
automatic—as, for example, belief formation may be (Alston, 1988). And it’s consistent with the fact that some 
cognitive processes have relatively automatic processes as their proper parts, or as their inputs. The point is just that 
cognition is the paradigmatic deliberate system. Exactly how deliberate it is is of course subject to empirical debate.
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The case regarding the dorsal stream is more complicated. According to the account outlined 
above, the dorsal stream’s primarily role is the guidance of online motor activity. In reaching for 
my mug, for example, I employ dorsal stream representations to adjust the aperture of my grip as 
my hand approaches. That activity, however, is dependent on my already having selected an 
action program (e.g “grab the mug”) which determines the appropriate behavioral response to 
certain visual parameters. Think of an action program as a set of action commands with 
conditional structure. The role of the dorsal stream’s guidance representation is to indicate which 
antecedents of those conditions are true and which are false. Thus, overt behavior is determined 
by combinations of action programs and guidance representations. It follows that dorsal stream 
representations do not determine overt behavior on their own, but rather only against a backdrop 
of a particular action program. This complicates our ability to determine the functional profile of 
dorsal stream representations, since it requires that we assess the automaticity of dorsal stream 
representations against this backdrop. So the claim is that, relative to a particular action program, 
dorsal stream guidance representations have their influence on action automatically, rather than 
deliberately. Specifically, I claim, dorsal stream guidance representations are mandatory, 
ballistic, and relatively autonomous. 
A core source of evidence that dorsal stream processes are automatic is their speed. As 
described above, dorsal stream processing appears to be organized so as to generate guidance 
representations quickly: it takes its inputs primarily from fast but coarse magno cells 
(Livingstone & Hubel, 1988; Merigan & Maunsell, 1993; Sawatari & Callaway, 1996; Milner & 
Goodale, 2006; Breitmeyer, 2014), its representations can be rapidly updated due to their short 
storage duration (Milner & Goodale, 2006, section 8.4.3), and so forth. In general, deliberate 
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processes are more time consuming than automatic processes, as the former operate over more 
inputs, must weigh further options, etc. Thus, rapid processing is a core piece of evidence that a 
process is automatic. In particular, it’s likely that the dorsal stream’s influence on action is both 
highly mandatory and highly ballistic. 
The case for the dorsal stream’s autonomy is less clear-cut. As rehearsed in Section 3.2, there 
is substantial evidence of functional and informational connectivity between the ventral and 
dorsal streams. The latter in particular suggest that dorsal stream processes operate in part over 
representations in the ventral stream, undermining the isolability of the two streams. Thus, it’s 
not plausible that dorsal stream guidance representations are fully autonomously produced. 
However, it remains plausible that dorsal stream processes are more autonomous than ventral 
stream ones, as, once again, the latter influence action only via cognition, a paradigmatically 
integrated mental unit. Thus, the processes which influence action via the ventral stream are 
likely far more integrated than those that influence action via the dorsal stream. 
Our final claim is that the low-road is automatic. Specifically, low-road influence is 
mandatory, and relatively autonomous and ballistic. The primary evidence for automaticity 
regarding the low-road is, again, speed. Low-road processes are causally antecedent to ventral 
stream ones, as they proceed directly from LGN to the amygdala, bypassing visual cortex 
(Tamietto & De Gelder, 2010). And evidence supports the implication that low-road processes 
are much faster than other perceptual processes, triggering fight or flight responses prior to 
conscious awareness (Tamietto et al., 2009). This speed weighs in favor of low-road processes 
being both mandatory and ballistic. 
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The question of autonomy is independent of these two issues, and turns on whether top-down 
processing influences perceptual representations in the LGN. While there has been little 
exploration of such influence, there is some evidence that task-demands cause back-propagation 
from visual cortex to LGN, enhancing or suppressing stimulus processing (Casagrande, Sáry, 
Royal, & Ruiz, 2005). That is, one’s goals influence the allocation of attentional resources as 
early as the thalamus. This suggests some indirect influence of ‘higher’ representations on low-
road representations. Thus, low-road processes are not entirely autonomous. Such influences, 
however, appear to be quite sparse, suggesting far less integration than ventral stream processes. 
Thus, we can say that low-road perceptual representations appear to be relatively autonomous. 
There’s also some evidence for diachronic influence of cognition on amygdala activity. 
Specifically, there is now widespread evidence that activity in the medial prefrontal cortex is 
anti-correlated with activity in the ventral amygdala (Milad & Quirk, 2002; Milad, Vidal-
Gonzalez, & Quirk, 2004; Santini, Ge, Ron, Ortiz, & Quirk, 2004; Holmes et al., 2012). This 
suggests that top-down influence can downregulate amygdala function, limiting its influence on 
threat response. Such influence suggests that the low-road is at least partially and diachronically 
interruptible. We cannot necessarily prevent representations in the LGN from triggering 
responses in the early amygdala, but we can regulate the downstream influence of that triggering 
on behavior. Here again, however, such interruptibility is to be contrasted with cognitive 
function, which is synchronically interruptible to a substantial degree. Thus, we can say that low-
road activity is relatively ballistic. 
Evidence across the three streams, then, supports the central contentions of computational 
division. Because the ventral stream has its influence on action via central cognition, that 
82
influence is paradigmatically deliberate: optional, interruptible, and integrated. By contrast, the 
dorsal stream and the low road influence action directly, and their computational profiles are 
relatively automatic: broadly mandatory, ballistic, and autonomous. 
Moreover, computational division can explain the evidence that challenged task-based 
division. The latter holds that different person-level tasks—program guidance and selection 
respectively—place conflicting computational demands on the systems that underlie them, thus 
requiring multiple streams with different computational profiles dedicated to each task. As we 
saw, however, the evidence suggests that multiple streams—each with different computational 
profiles—are involved in each of these person-level tasks. Thus, the function of functional 
division cannot be as simple as allowing for different systems for different tasks. But 
computational division holds that there are task-neutral advantages to enacting both automatic 
and deliberate processes in the performance of tasks. Thus, it predicts both multi-stream 
guidance and multi-stream selection. And this is precisely what we find: the ventral and dorsal 
streams enact deliberate and automatic processes respectively in the joint determination of 
program guidance, and the ventral stream and the low road enact deliberate and automatic 
processes respectively in the joint determination of program selection. This allows for both tasks 
to be performed using combinations of both quick-and-dirty and slow-and-deliberate strategies, 
optimizing performance. 
3.4 Coupled and Decoupled Processes 
Computational division captures the broad division of labor between the visual streams. And it 
explains the otherwise puzzling facts of multi-stream selection and multi-stream guidance.  But, 
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as a final step in the development of the view defended here, I’d like to revisit whether we 
should think of the function of functional division as task-neutral. Is the fundamental division 
between the ventral, dorsal, and low road streams simply one between deliberate and automatic 
processes? I think it is not, and the way in which it is not moves us closer to a middle ground 
between the two views discussed thus far. 
The view that I’m about to defend is motivated by three questions that remain for 
computational division. First, if the fundamental distinction between the streams is one between 
automatic and deliberate computational approaches, why are there at least three streams, rather 
than two? Second, given that the dorsal stream and the low road both enact broadly automatic 
processes, what is the function of the division between them? That is, why not just have one 
automatic visual processing system just as there appears to be one broadly deliberate one? Third, 
and on the other hand, why does there appear to be just one deliberate processing stream, which 
operates across multiple task-types, when there are multiple automatic processing streams? 
My view is that the division between visual streams is primarily one between a task-
decoupled stream and multiple task-coupled ones. Thus, the function of functional division is to 
enable the deployment of both task-coupled and task-decoupled processes in response to the 
same kinds of tasks. 
A task-coupled process is one such that fulfillment of its triggering conditions entails 
fulfillment of a downstream person-level task. All coupled processes are automatic, in that, at 
least, they are both mandatory and ballistic (and typically autonomous), but not all automatic 
processes are coupled, since not all automatic processes have a stereotyped person-level 
influence. Face detection, for example, is broadly automatic (it’s mandatory, ballistic, and 
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broadly autonomous), but since the detection of a face is not associated with a particular person-
level task, it is not coupled. 
This notion of ‘coupling’ is inspired by Kim Sterelny’s (2003) account of the evolution of 
perception/action systems. His idea is that such systems began as simple coupled systems. 
Cockroaches, for example, have special antennae which detect gusts of wind as they pass over 
the insect. When predatory toads leap toward the cockroach, the corresponding gust of wind 
automatically triggers a fleeing response. In this way, a simple coupled system allows the 
cockroach to avoid predation at minimal computational and metabolic cost (Camhi, 1984; 
Sterelny, 2003). But Sterelny argues that hostility (predation, competition, etc.) tends to select 
away from such easily exploitable coupled systems and toward more flexible decoupled ones. 
Thus, highly evolved critters like us will have highly complex perception/action systems such 
that token perceptual inputs determine intermediate representations, which are then employed to 
make highly flexible decisions about what to do next.  
Because decoupled systems are such that a given perceptual stimulus can be associated with 
a wide variety of internal or external behaviors, their representations are necessarily more 
abstract. We might think of coupled systems as employing representations which are roughly 
imperative: they simply instruct action systems to do particular things—i.e. to either run an 
action program or to update the guidance of that program. Decoupled systems, by contrast, 
operate over representations which are deployable across a range of tasks. Thus, we can think of 
such systems as employing descriptive models of the distal environment which are employed in 
making decisions about what to do next. These various features hang together: a decoupled 
system has options about what it can do in response to a given stimulus; thus, its representations 
85
are abstracted away from any given downstream task; and thus, it must employ those 
representations to make decisions about what to do next. Because these various features hang 
together in this way, Sterelny argues that highly decoupled systems are the foundation of 
cognition. 
If this line of thought is correct, then claims about the computational nature of perception/
action systems cannot be fully abstracted from claims about the range of tasks those systems can 
engage with. Automatic systems generally specialize to particular task-types, employing only 
locally useful information to allow for rapid and efficient influence on action — that is, they’re 
coupled. And deliberate systems become deliberate by gradually abstracting away from local 
task demands to enable greater flexibility in response — that is, they're decoupled. 
I claim that the ventral stream and downstream cognition constitute a decoupled perception/
action stream, while the dorsal stream and the low road constitute coupled perception/action 
streams. That claim is a kind of middle ground between task-based division and computational 
division. With task-based division, I accept a broad division between ‘vision for perception’ — 
here recast as visual processing which generates abstract models for the broad guidance of 
cognition — and ‘vision for action’ — here understood as action-coupled processing for 
particular downstream tasks (program selection in the case of the low road and program guidance 
in the case of the dorsal stream). And with computational division, I accept a division between 
broadly deliberate processing — carried out by a task-neutral system composed of the ventral 
stream and cognition — and automatic processing — carried out by multiple task-specific 
systems including the dorsal stream and the low road. 
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Like computational division, my account can explain the evidence that challenged task-based 
division: it directly predicts that there should be both coupled and decoupled processing streams 
for the same downstream task, when such a division makes computational sense. And this is 
precisely what we find in the models: it makes sense that there should be a coupled stream 
dedicated to the familiar, easy aspects of program guidance, while also allowing for a more 
deliberate stream which assists in the guidance of unfamiliar or difficult aspects of program 
guidance (Briscoe & Schwenkler, 2015). And it makes sense that there should be a coupled 
stream dedicated to trigger rapid fight-or-flight action programs in response to threatening 
stimuli, even as a more intelligent, deliberate stream handles the selection of other programs. 
Unlike simple computational division, however, my account answers the three questions with 
which I began this section. Why are there at least three streams, rather than just two, each 
corresponding to a particular computational profile? Because coupled processing systems are 
typically dedicated to particular task-types. Thus, in addition to a general decoupled processing 
system, it makes sense to have multiple coupled ones. What is the function of the division 
between the dorsal stream and the low road, given that they have the same general computational 
profile? The division allows for each stream to specialize in a particular task-type, optimizing 
performance. And why is there just one deliberate processing stream, when there are multiple 
automatic processing streams for different tasks? Because decoupled systems are, by their nature, 
task-neutral. It thus makes sense to employ one general model in making decisions across a 
range of task-types. 
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I mentioned in the introduction that local and global functional questions are mutually 
constraining: global functional accounts must be consistent with facts about the local function of 
individual mental units, and local functional accounts of those units are informed and revised by 
plausible answers to global functional questions. We’ve seen this dynamic play out in this 
chapter, and I’d like to conclude by highlighting several instances. 
First, of course, accounts of global function are beholden to local functional facts. As I’ve 
just argued, two otherwise plausible accounts of the function of functional division are 
undermined by the empirical evidence. Because task-based division holds that the division 
between visual streams enables each stream to specialize in a particular task according to its 
computational requirements, it is undermined by evidence for multi-stream guidance and 
selection. And because task-neutral computational division holds that the central division 
between streams is one of computational profile, not downstream task, it is undermined by 
evidence that the dorsal stream and the low road are task-specialized. In their place, I argued for 
a kind of middle view which predicts multiple task-coupled processing streams (the dorsal 
stream and the low road) and a single task-decoupled processing stream (composed of the ventral 
stream and downstream cognition). 
Second, our discussion highlights the importance of differentiating between global and local 
functional claims. Conflating the two can cause us to inappropriately reject accurate local 
functional ascriptions. Specifically, as we saw in Section 3.2, Milner and Goodale’s global 
functional claim — that the function of functional division is simply to enable task-specialization 
— but not their local functional claims — that the dorsal stream is for motor guidance while the 
ventral stream is for conscious perception — is undermined by evidence for multi-stream 
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guidance and selection. In fact, my own account of the function of functional division is largely 
consistent with the received accounts of the local function of each stream. Thus, the evidence 
which is typically taken to undermine Milner and Goodale’s theory in fact only undermines their 
account of the function of functional division. And once we replace their account with the correct 
one, we see that the central tenets of their model, along with their core implications, remain. 
Finally, however, answers to global functional questions can help us refine local functional 
claims, and to discover new features of the visual streams. Two implications of the account 
defended here are worth emphasizing here. First, my account supports the contention that the low 
road constitutes a third, independent visual stream. That is, independent of the direct case for the 
low-road as visual stream (which I’ve only gestured at here), my account of the function of 
functional division predicts that, ceteris paribus, there should be a coupled processing stream 
whenever the computational demands of a person-level task support it. The need for rapid 
program selection in response to threats is an obvious case of such a demand. Thus, the account 
provides broader theoretical support for the existence of such a stream. 
Second, my account makes predictions about the ways in which we can influence operations 
in the respective streams. Because the ventral stream’s influence is via cognition, our influence 
on downstream action is direct. This is a natural implication of decoupled processing streams: 
because there is no immediate connection between perceptual input and downstream behavior, 
there’s room for influence on that output. The dorsal stream and the low road, by contrast, are 
coupled systems; thus, their impact on behavior is automatic and thus less susceptible to direct, 
top-down control. This suggests that our influence over their behavior is at best indirect, 
involving broader regulation of ourselves and our environment. This final point reiterates the 
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most important implication of the division in visual streams: while our pre-theoretic intuitions 
give a central role to cognition in the determination of visually-guided behaviors, top-down 
control is in fact both incomplete and disunified. Thus, we must enact a variety of strategies to 
influence such behaviors.  
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Chapter 4: Responsibility and Perception 
On June 2nd, 2010, Armando Galarraga nearly became the twenty-first pitcher in Major League 
Baseball history to pitch a perfect game—one in which no opposing batter reaches base. The 
feat is rare; only twenty-three of the approximately 217,000 MLB games have been perfect 
games. On what would have been Galarraga’s final pitch, Jason Donald hit a ground ball that 
first baseman Miguel Cabrera ran to retrieve. Galarraga raced to first base to catch Cabrera’s 
throw and force Donald out. Umpire Jim Joyce ruled Donald safe, ending the perfect game. But 
that ruling was incorrect. Video clearly shows that Galarraga caught the ball and touched the 
base before Donald. After the game, Joyce immediately apologized. 
All agree that Joyce’s ruling was incorrect. But those familiar with sports fans will 
recognize additional language that is used in such cases: Joyce was ‘blind’, an ‘idiot’, and so on. 
The implication is that Joyce was not only wrong, but irrational, irresponsible, or unjustified in 
ruling as he did. That assessment is not without warrant. In what’s called a ‘force play’, 
Galarraga tried to catch the ball and touch the base before Donald. When close, it’s difficult to 
tell who touched the base first or whether the fielding player caught the ball in time. But this 
case was not close; Galarraga caught the ball and touched the base while Donald was a full 
stride away. This should have been an easy call for an umpire with Joyce’s experience. Umpires 
are taught a rule for perceiving force plays: they should look at the base while listening for the 
sound of the ball hitting the glove. This makes far easier the otherwise difficult task of tracking 
the locations of the ball and two people’s feet. One hypothesis is that Joyce failed to follow this 
rule. 
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While fans often jeer at umpires that make incorrect rulings, criticism has particular force 
when umpires miss something that is clearly evident. That is, criticism of Joyce’s ruling has a 
distinctively epistemic element. If this criticism is justified by Joyce’s failure to follow a rule 
about how to best perceive force plays, then this case adds to growing evidence for the 
epistemic relevance of an experience’s etiology (Siegel 2013). The case also suggests a new 
dimension of epistemic evaluation of that etiology. Joyce is accused of failing to follow a rule—
one that he should have followed—about how to position himself mentally and physically in 
order to have the right kind of perceptual experience. That is, Joyce formed his experience 
irresponsibly; and this redounds on the epistemic standing of his resulting belief. This 
consideration is independent of more familiar epistemic influences on perceptual beliefs—such 
as reliability or inferential character. 
In this chapter, I articulate and defend this sui generis dimension of epistemic influence on 
perceptual belief. I argue that beliefs based on irresponsibly formed experiences—experiences 
whose causes were not appropriately regulated by the subject—are doxastically unjustified.  In 
Section 4.1, I articulate the view I’m defending. In Section 4.2, I defend the premise that 
Joyce’s belief, but not that of a similarly situated novice, is unjustified. In Section 4.3, I show 
that this difference is best explained by irresponsible experience formation. In Section 4.4, I 
show that the epistemic relevance of responsible experience formation has broad implications 
for the epistemology of perceptual beliefs. 
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4.1 Responsible Experience Formation 
Joyce failed to follow a rule—one that he should have followed—about how to best perceive 
force plays. I’ll argue that Joyce formed his experience irresponsibly and that this redounds on 
the justification conferred to his belief. Specifically, I’ll defend two principles: 
Responsibility: S is responsible in having an experience regarding p just in case S does 
what’s reasonably expected to ensure that S’s experience is most apt regarding p. 
Downgrade: If S forms a first-order belief B with content P on the basis of an experience 
which is irresponsibly formed with respect to P, B is thereby doxastically unjustified, 
assuming that S has no other basis for B. 
Responsibility appeals to ‘reasonable expectations’ on experience formation. I’ll assume that 
one is reasonably expected to ɸ (in this sense) just in case one has an epistemic obligation to ɸ. 
My view thus extends such obligations to the formation of experiences. My argument will rely 
on there being both general and special epistemic obligations—and thus reasonable expectations
—regarding the formation of experiences. A general obligation to attend to immediately 
available relevant evidence is an example of the former. Crucially, I’ll claim that Joyce’s 
obligation to follow the rule is a special obligation required of Joyce in virtue of his being a 
professional umpire. More on this below. 
Responsibility also appeals to an experience’s ‘aptness’. Experiences have multiple good-
making features regarding a particular content. They are, for example, more or less informative 
regarding p and more or less reliable in these verdicts. The most apt experience regarding p is 
the one which best trades off these different virtues. Aptness doesn’t reduce to veridicality, since 
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different veridical perceptions can be more or less informative or reliable regarding p. Nor does 
responsibility reduce to aptness, since Responsibility concerns what one does to ensure aptness. 
One can have the most apt experience—via luck—without forming that experience responsibly. 
And one can form an experience responsibly—but unluckily—and fail to form the most apt 
experience. 
Responsibility is based on Ru Ye’s (2018) formulation of responsible belief formation. On 
her view, forming a belief irresponsibly—such as by failing to appropriately respond to a 
defeater—undermines doxastic justification. I extend this idea to the formation of experiences. 
I’ve based my formulation on Ye’s because, unlike other recent accounts such as Peels’s (2017), 
her formulation is largely neutral about which particular epistemic obligations we have, the 
conditions under which we have those obligations, and the connection between those 
obligations and ‘normative attitudes’ like praise or blame. I’ll argue that in conditions like 
Joyce’s, experts have a special epistemic obligation to enact certain procedures in forming their 
experiences. And I’ll claim that in such cases we can reasonably blame experts who fail to meet 
such obligations. But rather than offering a general theory of the particular obligations we have 
and the conditions under which we have them, my aim is to show that my view has unique 
explanatory advantages in cases like Joyce’s. I’ll thus remain neutral regarding a broader theory 
(though see Section 4.4). 
Downgrade is based on Susanna Siegel’s (2013) ‘Doxastic Downgrade Thesis’ (more on 
which in Section 4.3.3). The restriction to first-order beliefs excludes beliefs like “It looks as if 
there is a cup in front of me”, which describe the experience itself and are not intuitively subject 
to downgrade. While Siegel has gone on to claim that downgrade impacts an experience’s 
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‘epistemic charge’ such that both an experience and its etiology are rationally assessable (2017), 
Downgrade is neutral on these points. It allows, for example, that downgrade occurs because the 
subject—and not the etiology or experience—is epistemically evaluable. 
Responsibility and Downgrade are relativized to both particular subjects of experience and 
particular belief contents. These restrictions allow for an experience to confer justification for 
some beliefs (such as, “Donald ran to first base”) without conferring justification to others (such 
as, “Donald touched the base immediately before Galarraga”). One potential worry for my view 
is that in a less-close case—such as when Donald reaches the base well before Galarraga—
Joyce can form his experience irresponsibly—by failing to follow the rule—but remain justified 
in his belief that Donald was safe. But this worry is addressed by the restriction to particular 
contents: failure to follow the rule only undermines the justificatory force of experiences 
regarding the close cases to which it applies, not all experiences of force plays. However, the 
restriction is neutral on whether experiences have contents (which is controversial; see Section 
4.3.3). It requires only the uncontroversial claim that the same perceptual experience can 
convey different levels of justification for different belief contents.  
My view, then, is that, since Joyce is a professional umpire, he has a special epistemic 
obligation—and thus is reasonably expected—to follow the rule when perceiving force plays. 
Since he formed his experience about a force play without following the rule, it follows from 
Responsibility that he formed that experience irresponsibly. And since he formed his belief that 
Donald was safe on the basis of the irresponsibly formed aspect of his experience, it follows 
from Downgrade that that belief is unjustified. In the next two sections, I defend this analysis by 
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showing that it best explains our verdicts in Joyce-like cases. Before turning to the direct 
argument for this claim, however, I must clarify the explanandum. I turn to this now. 
4.2 Perceptual Expertise and Special Epistemic Obligations 
In the next section, I’ll argue that irresponsible experience formation, and not defeat, reliability, 
or inference, can explain why Joyce’s belief, but not that of a similarly situated novice, is 
unjustified. In this section, I defend this difference in justification by arguing that it alone can 
explain why we can reasonably blame Joyce, but not the novice, for forming the belief that 
Donald is safe. I claim that Joyce, but not the novice, has a special epistemic obligation to 
follow the rule, and that his failure to do so undermines the justificatory status of his resulting 
belief. 
It’s worth noting, however, that one could reasonably (but wrongly, I think) deny the 
existence of such special obligations while accepting both Responsibility and Downgrade. 
Doing so would result in the view that Joyce and the novice either both responsibly or both 
irresponsibly formed their experiences and thus are equally justified in their resulting belief. 
This view lacks the corresponding explanatory advantages—since, as we will see, the verdict 
that Joyce and the novice are equally justified can be explained by defeat, reliability, or 
inference—but it could be defended by appeal to a more general theory of justification. Theories 
which explain doxastic justification by appeal to responsible belief formation—including 
deontological (Kornblith, 1983; Peels, 2017; and Ye, 2018) and virtue epistemic (Code, 1987; 
Montmarquet, 1993; Zagzebski, 1996; Baehr, 2011) approaches—are natural allies to the view 
defended here. Defenders of such theories may well subscribe to Responsibility and Downgrade 
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without subscribing to special epistemic obligations of the sort posited here. Indeed, as I’ll 
discuss in Section 4.4, Responsibility and Downgrade have theoretical interest well beyond their 
ability to explain special epistemic obligations regarding the formation of experiences. 
But a direct defense of Responsibility and Downgrade from the existence of special 
epistemic obligations—rather than an indirect argument from a general theory of justification—
has three advantages. First, since a direct defense is neutral between general theories of 
justification, it can be accepted independently of such theories. Second, since a direct defense 
can be accepted independently of general theories, it can serve as an independent constraint on 
them. If the argument of this chapter is sound, then any general theory of doxastic justification 
must explain the epistemic import of irresponsible experience formation just as, for example, 
they must explain the epistemic import of defeaters. I’ll suggest that the view defended here is 
incompatible with phenomenal conservatism (a paradigm internalist view) and compatible only 
with modified versions of process reliabilism (a paradigm externalist view). Finally, while 
previous defenses of responsibilist theories have focused on capturing the normative force of 
existing influences on doxastic justification—such as higher-order defeaters (Ye 2018)—the 
direct defense offered here cements responsible experience formation as a sui generis kind of 
influence, directly akin to defeat or bad inference. Responsible experience formation is an 
independent epistemic phenomenon that deserves analysis from within multiple competing 
frameworks. 
I turn now to a defense of the explanandum. Suppose that a novice also attempts to determine 
whether Galarraga’s force play was successful. Unlike Joyce, the novice doesn’t know the rule 
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about perceiving force plays. In the same circumstances as Joyce’s, they thus break the rule and 
also come to falsely believe that Donald was safe. This chapter aims to explain why the novice’s 
belief, but not Joyce’s, is justified. 
Since Joyce is a professional umpire, I’ll say that he is a perceptual expert regarding force 
plays. A perceptual expert about a domain is someone that we reasonably expect to form better 
experiences—e.g. to attend to the right things—in that domain. Examples abound. Doctors are 
perceptual experts regarding x-rays. Police officers are perceptual experts regarding traffic 
violations. Chicken sexers are perceptual experts regarding chicken sex.  
There are at least two conditions that might make someone a perceptual expert. First, when 
someone has proprietary knowledge about perceiving in a domain, we reasonably expect them 
to follow it. Since Joyce knows how to correctly perceive force plays, it’s reasonable to expect 
that he will. Second, when someone occupies a special epistemic social role, it’s reasonable to 
expect them to follow standard rules for occupiers of that role (Feldman 2000, 676). Since 
Joyce is a professional umpire, it’s reasonable to expect him to follow standard perceptual rules 
for umpires. Sometimes these two conditions might come apart, as when an incompetent umpire 
fails to know the rule or when an enthusiast novice does. And we might wonder what we can 
reasonably expect in such cases. But since the conditions go together in the Joyce case, and 
since my argument requires only one positive case, I won’t weigh in on this issue here. 
I claim that being a perceptual expert creates special obligations such that having expertise 
in a domain raises the standards of justification in that domain. Since both fail to meet this 
higher standard, Joyce’s belief, but not the novice’s, is unjustified. I posit this difference 
103
because it uniquely explains why we can reasonably blame Joyce, but not the novice, for acting 
as he does. I’ll consider two alternative explanations. 
A first alternative explanation for why we can blame Joyce (and not the novice) is that he fails a 
practical, rather than epistemic, obligation. Such a failure need not redound on doxastic 
justification. On this view, both Joyce and the novice are justified in their belief that Donald was 
safe, but Joyce has a special obligation to act on such justified beliefs only when he’s followed 
the rule. The recent epistemic literature has proposed several cases which fit this general profile. 
Consider: 
Jonathan is a quality inspector at the widget factory. One in a million widgets produced at 
the factory is defective. Jonathan’s job is to randomly inspect widgets to confirm that they 
work. Before inspecting a widget, he can justifiably believe that that widget is working, 
since only one in a million is defective. But before inspecting the widget, it would be 
inappropriate for Jonathan to write down ‘working’ on his form. And we could reasonably 
blame him if he did so. (Simplified from Adler, 2004) 
Matilda is Derek’s oncologist. She receives reliable testimony from a colleague—who has 
reviewed Derek’s tests, but who doesn’t share the details—that Derek has pancreatic 
cancer. Thus, Matilda is justified in believing that Derek has pancreatic cancer. But it 
would be inappropriate for Matilda to assert, based on this evidence, that Derek has 
cancer, since assertion in this context requires that Matilda have more information about 
the facts of the case. (Simplified from Lackey, 2011) 
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In both cases, while the subject’s belief is justified, they can be blamed if they don’t enact 
additional procedures before acting on their belief. Could we give a similar explanation of the 
Joyce case? 
There are two crucial differences between such cases and the Joyce case. First, the 
arguments in which the above cases are embedded rely heavily on the fact that the subject acts 
on a belief with the wrong kind of justification. Jonathan shouldn’t rely on statistical evidence 
when determining whether a particular widget is faulty. Matilda shouldn’t rely on isolated 
testimonial justification when asserting that Derek has cancer. It’s now commonly 
acknowledged that certain kinds of justification—especially ‘indirect’ forms like statistical or 
testimonial justification—can be insufficient for epistemically appropriate action. Joyce, by 
contrast, should (and must) rely on perceptual information when determining whether Donald is 
safe. He is blameworthy because of the way in which he forms his experience, not the fact that 
he bases his ruling on it at all. There’s no mismatch between this type of justification and 
Joyce’s action. Without such a mismatch, a direct impact on doxastic justification is the more 
plausible explanation. 
Second, while most will agree that Jonathan and Matilda have the appropriate doxastic 
attitude given their circumstances, Joyce has the wrong doxastic attitude given his. Regardless 
of his subsequent ruling, given that he failed to follow the rule, he should suspend judgement 
about whether Donald was safe, just as a scientist who fails to enact strict experimental controls 
should suspend judgement about the generalizability of their results.  If Joyce should suspend 
judgement, then his belief is unjustified.   
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A second explanation is that there is a general epistemic obligation to follow the rule in 
perceiving forced plays, but the novice is excused from blame for failing to follow it. On this 
view, both Joyce and the novice have unjustified beliefs, but only Joyce is blameworthy. 
Notice that, for such a response to work, it must deny the existence of any special 
obligations of the sort posited here. To refute this chapter’s argument, it’s not enough to simply 
deny a difference in justification in the Joyce case; one must also deny that there are any cases 
like the Joyce case on which there is such a difference. But there are cases like the Joyce cases 
for any instance of expertise. Doctors are taught how to look at x-ray results; police officers are 
taught how to look for traffic violations; chicken sexers are taught how to look for male and 
female chicks. Beyond perceptual cases, scientists are taught how to conduct proper 
experiments; judges are taught how to attend to the details of the law; etc. For the present 
suggestion to work, there must either be a general epistemic obligation to enact the relevant 
procedure in these disparate domains, or such know-how is epistemically irrelevant (except as a 
potential source of defeaters). Either result seems implausible. On the first horn, it seems 
implausible, for example, that we are born with a general epistemic obligation to perceive in 
accordance with the rule regarding force plays. On the second horn, it seems implausible that 
learning about such procedures has no impact on prima facie justification. A more plausible 
picture—the one defended here—is that epistemic progress—such as discovering better 
procedures for perceiving in specialized domains—brings with it special epistemic obligations 
for experts to enact those procedures. Those obligations directly impact doxastic justification. 
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4.3 Competing Explanations 
I’ve just argued that the novice’s belief, but not Joyce’s, is justified. The view presented in 
Section 4.1 gives a straightforward explanation of this difference: since Joyce, but not the 
novice, is reasonably expected to follow the rule, it follows from Responsibility that the novice, 
but not Joyce, formed their experience responsibly. And since they both formed their belief that 
Donald was safe on the exclusive basis of this experience, it follows from Downgrade that the 
novice, but not Joyce, is justified. This explanation is non-traditional in a variety of ways. 
Where accounts of empirical justification typically begin with perceptual experiences (and other 
kinds of mental states), the view defended here makes room for the direct epistemic relevance 
of the formation of perceptual experiences; including how extra-bodily processes contribute to 
those experiences. While some have defended the epistemic relevance of the formation of 
experiences (e.g. Siegel 2017), they have typically done so by appeal to top-down effects from 
other mental states, not the direct control of the formation of experiences themselves. In short, 
responsible experience formation is a different kind of influence on the doxastic justification of 
perceptual beliefs. Thus, if the Joyce cases are to motivate the positing of such an influence, we 
must first rule out a more traditional explanation of the difference in justification between Joyce 
and the novice. I’ll consider three alternative explanations—from defeat, reliability, and 
inference—and show they fail. The upshot is that responsible experience formation is an 
independent—though not necessarily exclusive—determinant of the epistemic status of 
perceptual beliefs. 
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4.3.1 Defeat  
A common position—particularly among internalists—is that the etiology of experience is not 
directly relevant to justification, but that evidence about that etiology can undermine otherwise 
justified perceptual beliefs (e.g., Pollock & Cruz 1999). If, for example, I seem to see a red cup 
sitting on a table, then I am prima facie justified in believing that the cup is red. But if I learn 
that the cup is illuminated by red lights, then I cannot rule out its being a white cup that merely 
looks red in these conditions. Thus, my belief is defeated by my knowledge of the illumination. 
It has recently been proposed that a fact is a ‘normative defeater’ if, (a) it would function as a 
classical defeater if known and (b) the subject should know it (Lackey, 2008, 45). If, for 
example, I ignore evidence about the lighting conditions—such that I am negligent in not 
knowing that the scene is illuminated by red lights—then my belief that the cup is red is 
(normatively) defeated by this unpossessed evidence. 
Could defeat explain the Joyce case? Since Joyce failed to follow the rule, he may know that 
his experience was formed unreliably. That evidence would constitute an undercutting defeater 
for his belief. If Joyce’s belief is defeated, then it isn’t justified. Moreover, since the novice 
doesn’t know the rule, their belief isn’t defeated by this evidence. So defeat could explain why 
the verdict differs between the cases. 
But it's unlikely that Joyce is in a position to know whether he followed the rule and thus 
formed his experience unreliably, since the difference between following and not following the 
rule is subtle. Expert perceivers do not generally attend to the precise way in which they form 
their experiences. Following the rule is an application of procedural knowledge, akin to 
following a rule of inference. When we do the latter, we do not reason from the rule, we simply 
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reason in accordance with it. Similarly, when Joyce follows the rule, he merely perceives in 
accordance with it. A consequence is that Joyce can irresponsibly fail to follow the rule—just as 
one might irresponsibly fail to follow a rule of inference—without knowing that he failed to 
follow it. If Joyce doesn’t know whether he failed to follow the rule, then that knowledge 
cannot constitute a classical defeater for his belief. 
Could Joyce’s unjustified belief be explained by a normative defeater? That is, should Joyce 
know that he failed to follow the rule? The question is not simply whether such a case is 
possible, since of course it is, but whether all cases of irresponsible experience formation entail 
the existence of a normative defeater. That would be true only if an obligation to follow a 
procedural rule entails an obligation to know whether you’ve succeeded in following that rule. 
But there is no general obligation to know what procedures you’ve employed in arriving at a 
belief or experience. In the belief case, that would entail the clearly false claim that higher-order 
defeaters accompany all irrational inferences. In the experience case, it would entail an 
obligation to attend to the application of habitual perceptual rules, even when doing so 
decreases performance (as it often does). That would be a surprising requirement. If there isn’t 
that requirement, then it’s possible to be obligated to follow a rule about how to form one’s 
experience without an obligation to know whether you’ve succeeded. In such cases, 
irresponsible experience formation will not entail the existence of a normative defeater. 
In summary, while it’s true that evidence of Joyce’s failure to follow the rule would 
constitute a defeater for his belief, there’s no reason to think he either possesses or should 
possess this evidence. More generally, whenever there’s an obligation to follow a rule about the 
formation of one’s experience without an obligation to know whether one succeeds in following 
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that rule, irresponsible experience formation, but not defeat, can explain an unjustified 
perceptual belief. 
4.3.2 Reliability 
While internalists typically appeal to defeat to explain a change in the doxastic justification of a 
perceptual belief, externalists can explain the change more directly by appeal to the experience’s 
unreliability. By hypothesis, the rule that Joyce failed to follow is one that improves the 
reliability of his experiences. If doxastic justification is at least partially determined by the 
reliability of the process that produces a belief, then failing to follow the rule may result in a 
belief that is less justified than a belief formed in adherence to the rule. This could explain why 
Joyce’s belief is unjustified. 
The proposal faces two immediate problems. First, the fact that following the rule improves 
reliability does not entail that failing to follow the rule drops reliability below the threshold for 
prima facie justification. Having failed to follow the rule, Joyce uses ordinary perceptual 
procedures in forming his judgment about the play. Reliabilists typically assume that these 
procedures are reliable enough for prima facie justification. So it’s not clear how the standard 
reliabilist picture can explain Joyce’s unjustified belief. 
But suppose it does. Then the explanation faces a second problem: the novice and Joyce 
employed the same belief-forming process in the same context. It follows that they were equally 
reliable. Either this reliability is above the threshold—and both are justified—or it’s below the 
threshold—and neither is justified. Thus, reliability cannot explain why Joyce’s belief, but not 
the novice’s, is unjustified.  
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[Removed for review] has suggested another possible response on behalf of the reliabilist. 
On the ‘alternative reliable process’ (ARP) account of defeat, S’s belief that P is defeated if S 
has available a more reliable process which would result in S’s not believing that P (Goldman, 
1979; Lyons, 2009). Intuitively, Joyce, but not the novice, has available to him the more reliable 
process incorporating application of the rule. And by hypothesis applying that rule would have 
resulted in the correct ruling that Donald was not safe. So, if we assume that experience 
formation is a partial constituent of the relevant process that produces a belief, it follows from 
ARP that Joyce’s belief, but not the novice’s, is defeated and thus unjustified. 
This is not what Goldman or Lyons intended in extending ARP as a reliabilist theory of 
defeat. As I’ve just argued, Joyce’s unjustified belief is not explainable by the presence of a 
defeater. And if it were, the relevant defeater would be evidence that Joyce formed his 
experience irresponsibly, not the mere fact that he did. Goldman (1979, 20) makes clear that he 
doesn’t intend ARP to include application of alternative evidence-gathering processes like 
Joyce’s attending differently to the force play:  
“[I]t seems implausible to say all ‘available’ processes ought to be used, at least if we 
include such processes as gathering new evidence. Surely a belief can sometimes be 
justified even if additional evidence-gathering would yield a different doxastic attitude. 
What I think we should have in mind here are such additional processes as calling 
previously acquired evidence to mind, assessing the implications of that evidence, etc.” 
It’s interesting, then, that applying ARP to the Joyce case gets the case right. Perhaps Goldman 
was too quick to dismiss broader application of ARP. 
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However, ARP fails to capture a variant of the Joyce case. In Section 4.2, I argued that 
perceptual experts like Joyce should be held to higher epistemic standards. It follows that Joyce 
is unjustified in failing to follow the rule even if, either way, he comes to the correct conclusion 
that Donald was out. But since ARP is a theory of defeat, it requires that the alternative reliable 
process result in a different doxastic attitude. So if Joyce would form the same belief regardless 
of whether he follows the rule, irresponsible experience formation, but not ARP, can explain 
why his belief is unjustified. 
What if we remove ARP’s requirement that the alternative process result in a different 
belief? Then the view says that S’s belief in P is unjustified if there is a more reliable process 
that S could have employed which also results in a belief whether-P. That principle would 
explain both the original and modified Joyce cases. It would do so by entailing that one is 
justified in a perceptual belief only if one employs the most reliable available process in 
forming that belief. This, in turn, entails that the subject should use any available procedures to 
form the most apt experience with respect to that belief. That is, the view entails Downgrade. It 
thus no longer provides a competing explanation of the Joyce case. 
In summary, mere reliability cannot explain why Joyce’s belief, but not the novice’s, is 
unjustified. A reliabilist account of defeat—but not the version typically defended by reliabilists
—can account for the cases, but not the modified cases in which following and not following 
the rule result in the same belief. There is a version of reliabilism that can explain all of the 
cases, but that version is also committed to Downgrade. I conclude that reliabilist resources do 
not provide a competing explanation of Joyce-like cases. 
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4.3.3 Inference 
Susanna Siegel (2017) has recently offered a powerful defense of the view that perceptual 
experiences are caused by inferences whose rational character influences their epistemic status. 
When an experience is caused by an irrational inference, she argues, its justificatory force is 
downgraded. Thus, if it can be shown that Joyce’s experience was formed by an irrational 
inference, Siegel’s account can explain the verdict that Joyce’s belief is unjustified without 
appeal to irresponsible experience formation. 
It’s instructive when looking for such an inference that Siegel’s paradigm cases look very 
different from the Joyce case. Whatever the exact nature of Joyce’s failure, it’s related to the fact 
that he failed to follow a rule about how to place himself physically and mentally in order to 
best perceive force plays. In Siegel’s cases, by contrast, the subject is apparently irrationally 
influenced by some other mental state. Consider: 
Anger: Before seeing Jack, Jill fears that Jack is angry at her. When she sees him, her fear 
causes her to have a visual experience in which he looks angry to her. (Siegel 2013) 
Siegel claims that Jill’s experience is downgraded because of an irrational influence of her fear 
on her experience. That influence amounts to an irrational inference from Jill’s ‘outlook’—the 
sum-total of her beliefs, desires, assumptions, etc. regarding Jack and anger—to her experience. 
This explanation of what goes wrong in Anger requires that one accept four controversial 
claims. The first two hang together: since Siegel’s explanation involves an inference from a fear 
to an experience with the content ‘Jack is angry at me’, it requires, first, that experiences have 
113
content and, second, that some of that content is rich. While Siegel has argued extensively for 
these claims, they remain the subject of much debate. 
The third controversial claim required for Siegel’s account is that perceptual contents are 
cognitively penetrable. On her view, experiences are downgraded when they are formed by an 
irrational inference from a subject’s outlook—her beliefs, assumptions, moods, and so forth—to 
her experience. This is not an accident: Siegel’s argument that experiences are formed by 
inferences, discussed below, is that the influence of cognitive states on experiences is 
epistemically on par with their influence on beliefs. Thus, the inferential character of perception 
is tied to its cognitive penetrability. But it’s not clear whether experiences are penetrable in this 
way. 
Finally, of course, Siegel’s view requires that this cognitive penetration amounts to a 
rationally-assessable inference. This too is controversial. After all, paradigm rational inferences 
do not look like cognitive penetration. Logical reasoning, for example, is typically conscious, it 
involves recognizing that a conclusion is supported by some premises, and our drawing the 
conclusion is optional. Cognitive penetration, by contrast, is never conscious, it never involves 
recognizing that an experience is supported by some premises, and perceptual experiences are 
paradigmatically non-optional. Siegel has responded to each of these points, showing that there 
are inferentially formed beliefs that lack each of these features (2017, Ch. 5). And she presents a 
positive case that experiences are formed by inferences. She points out that cases like Anger are 
exactly analogous to inferentially irrational beliefs. Jill’s fear influences her experiences in a 
way that, were the result a belief, we’d regard as inferentially irrational. Her conclusion gives 
'improper weight' to her fears (2017, 5): 
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Her fear makes her respond to the blank stare by experiencing Jack as angry, just as in a 
case of fearful thinking, it might make her respond to the blank stare by believing that 
Jack is angry. Here, experiences are responses to other experiences, just as conclusions 
are responses to inferential inputs. And like inferential responses generally, responses to 
experiences can be explained by the subject’s rational sensitivity to the relations, as the 
subject sees them, between Jack’s blank stare and the rest of her outlook concerning Jack 
and anger (2017, 118). 
Since fearful seeing and fearful thinking go wrong in the same way, and since we say that 
fearful thinking results from an irrational inference, we should say the same of fearful seeing. 
But the claim remains controversial. In particular, many have argued that experiences, 
unlike beliefs, cannot be epistemically ‘based’ on their causes and thus cannot by formed by 
inferences (Lyons, 2011, 2016; Ghijsen, 2015, 2016, 2018; Beck et. al, 2018). 
It’s not my goal to relitigate these disputes. My point is simply that Siegel’s account of 
downgrade depends on each of these commitments; and that irrational inference is a competing 
explanation in Joyce-like cases only if these commitments turn out to be true. Irresponsible 
belief formation, by contrast, entails none of these commitments. It’s neutral on our account of 
perceptual content, so long as one accepts that some perceptual experiences are more apt for a 
given belief than others. It’s neutral about which kinds of influences—cognitive penetration, 
attention, and so forth—are the ones for which we’re epistemically responsible, so long as we 
can regulate those influences with our actions. And it doesn’t require any particular rational 
connection between an action and an experience, so long as the action meets the conditions for 
responsibility.  
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We’re now in a position to see why an inferential explanation of the Joyce cases is not 
available. Such an explanation would require (1) that Joyce’s experience be detrimentally 
influenced by his outlook, (2) that this influence is structurally similar to inferentially irrational 
belief-formation, and (3) that this influence not obtain in the novice case. None of these features 
are present in the Joyce cases. There’s no reason to think—and anyway the case doesn’t require 
that we think—that Joyce antecedently believed, desired, feared, or had any particular attitude 
toward Donald’s being safe. The judgment that Joyce’s belief is unjustified relies on a claim 
about his failing to follow the rule. The difference between the good case—in which he 
followed that rule—and the bad case—in which he didn’t—is not a difference in Joyce’s 
outlook regarding Donald’s being safe. Second, the transition from Joyce’s failing to follow the 
rule to his experiencing Donald as safe does not resemble an inferentially irrational belief-
forming process, even if that transition is itself irrational. And last, since Joyce and the novice 
used the same process in forming their experiences, even if Joyce’s experience were formed by 
an irrational inference, the novice’s would be as well.  
One could respond that Siegel’s Anger case, an apparent instance of an irrational influence 
on experience is the wrong comparison. Siegel also argues that irrational influences on attention 
influence the epistemic standing of resulting experiences (2017, 157-160). She considers, for 
example, a case in which an overconfident host (Vivek) attempts to determine whether his 
guests are enjoying themselves but, due to his presumption that they are, fails to attend to a 
sulky person in the corner, waiting for a ride home (2017, 168). Vivek’s outlook illicitly 
influences his attention such that only confirming evidence is experienced. For this reason, 
Siegel claims that Vivek’s resulting experience is irrational. Since I’ve claimed that Joyce’s 
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unjustified belief is explained by his failing to follow a rule about allocating his attention, it’s 
possible that a similar explanation is available here. That would require that Joyce’s failure be 
explainable by an irrational inference from his outlook to the allocation of his attentional 
resources. But without looking at exactly how that inference should go, we can see that this 
explanation would face the same challenges as the one considered above. Here again, since 
there’s no reason to assume that Joyce had any particular antecedent attitude toward Donald’s 
being safe, the case cannot be explained by an inference from such an attitude to his attention. 
And even if such an inferential explanation were available, it would also be available in the 
novice case, since they employed the same process in forming their experiences. So this 
explanation cannot explain why the verdicts differ between the cases. 
4.4 Implications  
The argument just presented relies on experts’ special obligations to enact procedures not 
required of novices. The corresponding difference in justification, I’ve argued, is explainable 
only by the principle that beliefs based on irresponsibly formed experiences are unjustified. 
Thus, irresponsible experience formation has unique explanatory advantages. This argument 
might give the impression that the epistemic impact of irresponsible experience formation is 
minimal. But once the epistemic relevance of irresponsible experience formation is established, 
its impact redounds throughout our epistemic lives. In this final section, I’ll comment briefly on 
this impact. 
While my emphasis here has been on special epistemic obligations, it’s likely that there are 
both general and special obligations regarding the formation of experiences. It’s plausible, for 
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example, that we have a general epistemic obligation to attend to immediately available 
evidence concerning occurrent beliefs. My belief that it’s acceptable to feed the zoo animals, for 
example, is undermined by the presence, even if I don’t notice it, of a sign that says otherwise 
(Gibbons 2006). In this way, our general epistemic obligations concerning experience formation 
can explain certain kinds of normative defeaters. I suggested in Section 4.2 that there are at least 
two kinds of special epistemic obligations: those grounded in what we know and those grounded 
in our social roles. Joyce’s special obligation to follow the rule holds both in virtue of what he 
knows and his social role. Similar cases abound: scientists have special obligations to attend to 
certain kinds of evidence; police officers have special obligations to recognize when an object is 
(or isn’t) a weapon; psychologists have special obligations to pick up on signs of trauma. Other 
special obligations may be contingently universal, such as an obligation, given widespread 
evidence, to regulate the influence of implicit biases on our experiences (Washington and Kelly 
2016). In short, concerns about responsible experience formation apply throughout our 
epistemic lives. 
Susanna Siegel’s recent work has highlighted the wide variety of ways in which the etiology 
of experience may redound on the epistemic standing of perceptual beliefs. The responsibility 
view can incorporate Siegel’s inferentialist framework in two ways. First, much of the literature 
on responsibilist accounts of doxastic justification highlight good inference as a paradigm 
example of responsible belief formation. Thus, if experiences are formed by inferences whose 
rational standing redounds on their epistemic standing, then this can be seen as a special case of 
the responsibility view. But I noted in the last section that Siegel’s framework makes several 
controversial commitments not shared by the responsibility view. Perhaps most notably, the 
118
responsibility view can explain cases of epistemic downgrade without requiring that 
experiences be formed by inference. Thus, the responsibility view may explain Siegel’s cases 
even if experiences are not inferentially formed. We may, for example, have general or special 
obligations to prevent influence of our fears on our experiences. 
As discussed in Section 4.2, a direct argument for Responsibility and Downgrade, like the 
one developed here, establishes irresponsible experience formation as an independent 
explanandum for general theories of doxastic justification. If the above arguments are sound, 
then irresponsible experience formation is a sui generis influence on doxastic justification—
akin to defeat—whose epistemic import must be captured by broader theories. Like Siegel’s 
account, Downgrade challenges hard internalist positions committed to phenomenal 
conservatism, since it denies that, in the absence of defeaters, having an experience that p 
suffices for immediate justification of a belief that p. Unlike Siegel’s account, however, 
Downgrade also challenges external accounts, since, as established in Section 4.3.2, no existing 
reliabilist account can capture the epistemic import of irresponsible experience formation. 
Finally, the responsibility view broadens the notion of epistemic downgrade itself. The 
literature on epistemic downgrade has its roots in debates over the epistemic implications of 
cognitive penetration. If our experiences are influenced by our beliefs, desires, emotions and so 
forth, then it seems this should have an impact on their epistemic standing. Inferentialism is 
designed to vindicate this intuition. As a result, Siegel’s inferentialist conception of downgrade 
assumes that experiences are cognitively penetrated. While the responsibility view can account 
for the epistemic relevance of cognitive penetration, it also explains cases in which experiences 
are downgraded by other causes. Joyce’s failure to follow the rule, for example, is not an 
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instance of cognitive penetration. The responsibility view thus reorients the debate over 
epistemic downgrade by treating cognitive penetration as a mere special case; and it extends the 
range of possible epistemic influence on perception to attentional effects, perceptual learning, 
priming, and so forth. Future investigation into downgrade should explore the epistemic impact 
of a broad range of possible influences on perception. More generally, the responsibility view 
makes room for new discussion of the relationship between our understanding of our own 
perceptual processing and its influences and the epistemic standing of our perceptual beliefs. 
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Chapter 5: Degree Encroachment 
This chapter articulates a new theory of pragmatic or moral encroachment according to which 
traditionally non-epistemic factors influence whether a subject has knowledge by helping to 
determine which epistemic reasons and procedures they employ in forming their belief. Since 
doxastic justification is a function of reasons and procedures, this view entails that non-epistemic 
factors encroach on the epistemic by influencing the degree of graded justification the subject 
has for her belief. 
Section 5.1 discusses the extant literature on encroachment and distinguishes between 
‘degree encroachment’ and ‘threshold encroachment’. Section 5.2 argues for degree 
encroachment on reasons. Section 5.3 argues for degree encroachment on procedures. Section 
5.4 articulates two advantages of degree encroachment over its extant competitors. 
5.1 Degree Encroachment and Threshold Encroachment 
An epistemic theory posits encroachment only if, holding fixed traditionally epistemic factors, 
variations in traditionally non-epistemic factors can influence an epistemic status (such as 
whether a subject knows, is justified, or has a rational credence). To see this, consider the 
following pairs of cases: 
Bank Cases: Keith is deciding whether to deposit a paycheck on Friday or Saturday. He 
remembers that it was open on Saturday two weeks ago, but it’s possible that 
there’s an exception this Saturday. In Low-Stakes, it makes no difference whether 
Keith deposits the check this weekend. In High-Stakes, a very important check will 
bounce if the paycheck is not deposited this weekend. In Low-Stakes, but not in 
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High-Stakes, Keith knows the bank is open on Saturday. (simplified from DeRose, 
2005) 
Street Cases: Sarah is deciding whether to cross the street in response to a perceived threat. 
In Low-Stakes, she judges that a pit-bull on her side of the street is more likely to 
bite her than any dog across the street. In High-Stakes, she judges that a black 
person on her side of the street is more likely to steal her purse than anyone across 
the street. Her evidence for these claims is equally strong. Nonetheless, in Low-
Stakes, but not in High-Stakes, Sarah has knowledge. (simplified from Moss, 2018) 
Both pairs of cases conclude with a commonly-held judgment about the differences between the 
cases. The claim is that the difference in stakes results in a difference in whether the subject 
knows, even though traditional epistemic factors are the same. The first case is an instance of 
pragmatic encroachment because the subject’s practical stakes intuitively influence whether the 
subject knows. The second case is an instance of moral encroachment because the subject’s 
moral stakes intuitively influence whether the subject knows. The general phenomenon of 
traditionally non-epistemic factors influencing an epistemic status is sometimes called 
‘pragmatic encroachment,’ with moral encroachment as a special case. I find this language 
misleading, since on most meta-ethical theories moral stakes do not necessarily influence 
practical stakes. I’ll refer to the general phenomenon simply as ‘encroachment’ with pragmatic 
and moral encroachment as special cases. Nothing will turn on this choice of language. While I 
will not defend either pragmatic or moral encroachment in particular, my theory can explain 
instances of both. 
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Brian Weatherson (2005) has made an important clarification to our concept of 
encroachment. A non-epistemic influence on an epistemic status counts as encroachment only if 
it does so by influencing a normative component of that status. A belief, by contrast, is a non-
normative component of knowledge. His 2005 article defends (but he now rejects; see his 2012) 
the view that purported cases of encroachment on knowledge are merely influences of non-
epistemic factors on belief. 
Most theories of encroachment (including my own) aim to explain influences of non-
epistemic factors on knowledge by positing influence of those factors on knowledge-level 
justification. I’ll assume, with the literature, that justification above some threshold is a 
necessary condition on knowledge. Thus, non-epistemic factors can influence whether a subject 
has knowledge-level justification either by influencing the location of that threshold—what I’ll 
call ‘threshold encroachment’—or by influencing the degree to which the subject’s belief is 
justified—what I’ll call ‘degree encroachment’. Most defenders of encroachment defend 
threshold encroachment. My view is a kind of degree encroachment. 
 
5.2 Encroachment on Reasons 
Alex Worsnip (2021) suggests we think about 
justification in terms of a ‘beaker of reasons’ (see 
Fig. 5.1). The more reasons one has for one’s belief, 
the fuller the beaker. If one has enough reasons, 
they pass a threshold and the belief is knowledge-




Figure 5.1: The ‘Beaker of  Reasons’. Based on a 
figure from Worsnip (2021)
the beaker by changing either which reasons are in the beaker (a kind of degree encroachment) or 
the location of the threshold (a kind of threshold encroachment). 
Degree encroachment has not been widely discussed in the literature. The only version 
discussed, to my knowledge, is the view that non-epistemic factors influence the contents of the 
beaker by constituting reasons for and against belief. I call this the ‘reasons-constituting’ view. A 
reasons-constituting explanation of the bank cases, for example, would say that, in High-Stakes, 
the fact that it matters to Keith whether the bank is open is a reason against believing that the 
bank is open on Saturday, lowering the level in the beaker below the threshold. This view is 
widely rejected in the literature on the grounds that it faces a devastating ‘wrong kind of reasons’ 
objection: even if we think that stakes influence justification, stakes are not evidentially related 
to whether the bank is open on Saturday. It’s therefore hard to see how they could constitute 
epistemic reasons for or against believing the bank is open on Saturday (Worsnip, 2021; Fritz, 
2020; Bolinger, 2020). 
There’s another version of degree encroachment that hasn’t been discussed in the literature, 
however. That’s the view that non-epistemic factors help determine which epistemic reasons one 
possesses without themselves constituting reasons for or against belief. I call this the ‘reasons-
determining’ view. Like the reasons-constituting view, the reasons-determining view says that 
non-epistemic factors influence the contents of the beaker. Thus, the reasons-determining view is 
also a kind of degree encroachment. But unlike the reasons-constituting view, the reasons-
determining view doesn’t claim that non-epistemic factors are themselves contents of the beaker 
of reasons. Instead, non-epistemic factors help determine which classically epistemic reasons 
enter the beaker. 
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How could non-epistemic factors help determine which epistemic reasons enter the beaker? 
Suppose that I believe that my flight will leave on time, but, unbeknownst to me, the flight board 
(which is right in front of me) says that my flight is delayed. The traditional view is that a piece 
of evidence is relevant to justification only if it is accessible upon reflection (Pappas, 2017). The 
contents of the board are not accessible to me upon reflection, so this view entails that it cannot 
be a reason for me to abandon my belief. Since it’s not a reason for me to abandon my belief, it 
cannot undermine my justification.  
But this traditional view is challenged by cases in which I clearly should have access to a 
piece of evidence that undermines my belief. Suppose, for example, that I’m supposed to pick up 
my child from daycare on the other end of this flight. I’m obligated to make arrangements if I 
won’t be making the pickup on time. Then, plausibly, I should check the board (especially since 
it’s right in front of me) and so I should have access to the fact that my flight is delayed. I cannot 
justifiably believe that P if I should have conclusive evidence that not-P. So I need not have 
reflective access to evidence for it to count as a reason against my belief (Gibbons, 2006; 
Lackey, 2008). 
One way, then, that non-epistemic factors can determine which epistemic reasons enter the 
beaker is if non-epistemic factors can make it the case that I should have certain evidence. To see 
this, contrast the case just mentioned with an exactly analogous case in which it doesn’t 
particularly matter (morally or practically) whether my flight lands on time. In this case, I 
plausibly don’t have an obligation to check the board and so can justifiably believe that my flight 
will land on time. The difference between the cases is the stakes; and the result of this difference 
is a difference in which reasons enter the beaker. 
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Notice that the reason that I possess in the high stakes case, but not in the low stakes case—
the evidence from the flight board—is a straightforwardly epistemic reason. It’s truth or falsity is 
probabilistically relevant to the truth or falsity of my belief, for example. Once we stipulate that 
this evidence is in my beaker of reasons, the conclusion that my belief is unjustified follows from 
ordinary epistemic principles. The stakes, then, are not themselves reasons for or against belief, 
but they do help determine which epistemic reasons the subject has. Also notice that the 
argument that I’m unjustified in high stakes, but not in low stakes, does not depend on a prior 
judgment about whether it’s appropriate to attribute knowledge to me. Instead, the argument 
turns on independently-motivated arguments about the conditions for reason possession. These 
two features—allowing for a traditional function from epistemic factors to justification, and 
admitting of independent motivation from outside of the encroachment literature—are core 
strengths of my view. 
The reasons-determining view is similar to a ‘relevant alternatives’ contextualism according 
to which non-epistemic factors help determine which alternatives a subject must rule out to count 
as knowing (e.g. Moss, 2018). They agree, for example, that my knowledge is undermined in the 
high-stakes flight case because I failed to check the board. And they give similar explanations of 
why: high-stakes make it the case that I should check whether my flight is delayed. But the views 
differ in two ways. First, the relevant alternatives view is, as it’s typically formulated, a version 
of threshold encroachment, while the reasons-determining view is a version of degree 
encroachment. The reasons-determining view says that higher stakes require that I respond to a 
different set of epistemic reasons than lower stakes. Thus, my belief is less justified in higher-
stakes situations. The relevant alternatives view, by contrast, says that higher stakes require that I 
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respond to the same reasons in a different way to count as justified. Higher stakes raise the 
threshold for knowledge-level justification. As a result, the relevant alternatives view—and all 
threshold accounts—have the counterintuitive result that responding to the same set of epistemic 
reasons in the same way does not determine whether a belief is justified across all cases. My 
view, by contrast, does not have this entailment. 
A second difference between the views is their scope. The relevant alternatives view says that 
a belief that P doesn’t count as knowledge unless the subject rules out all the relevant alternatives 
to P. That is, believing that P is justified only if it’s epistemically impossible (relative to the 
relevant set of possibilities) that not-P. The corresponding reasons-determining view would be 
that believing that P isn’t justified if one possesses (or should possess) reasons to believe that 
not-P. A reason to believe that not-P is a rebutting defeater for a belief that P. But not all defeaters 
are rebutting defeaters. And not all reasons are defeaters. So, the reasons-determining view 
allows for more ways in which non-epistemic factors can influence the justification status of a 
belief. For example, pragmatic factors may make it the case that one has a (normative) 
undermining defeater for one’s belief. Perhaps in high-stakes scenarios, for example, I should 
rule out the possibility that the lighting conditions are influencing my visual judgments. This 
consideration is independent of whether my visual judgments are incorrect.  Or suppose that, in a 
high-stakes scenario, the flight board confirms my belief that I’ll make my flight, but I 
nonetheless fail to check it. The evidence I should respond to (including the content of the board) 
might propositionally justify my belief, but I might fail to appropriately base my belief on this 
evidence. In this case, raised stakes result in my belief lacking justification, not because of the 
presence of a defeater, but because my belief fails to be based on the appropriate reasons. 
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5.3 Encroachment on Procedures 
The last section employed Worsnip’s ‘beaker of reasons’ framework and argued that there is a 
sensible way to defend degree encroachment on reasons: rather than non-epistemic factors 
constituting reasons for or against beliefs (and thus entering the beaker of reasons), they instead 
help determine which epistemic reasons one has. If so, then they can explain why one’s reasons 
fall below the threshold in high-stakes scenarios without appealing to a change in that threshold. 
I must now make an important clarification. Propositional justification concerns whether a 
subject has sufficient reason to believe a given proposition. Doxastic justification concerns 
whether a belief is appropriately held. It’s plausible that one is knowledge-level propositionally 
justified whenever one’s reasons for a target proposition rise above a threshold. The beaker of 
reasons is thus a useful framework for thinking about propositional justification. But it is not 
plausible that one is knowledge-level doxastically justified whenever one’s reasons rise above 
the threshold. Doxastic justification also requires that one execute the right procedures, that is, 
that one respond to one’s reasons in the right way (Swain, 1979; Pollock & Cruz, 1999; Korcz, 
2000; Feldman, 2002; Kvanvig, 2003). So the beaker of reasons is not a good framework for 
thinking about doxastic justification. 
The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification is not widely discussed in the 
encroachment literature. If you accept the threshold view, it doesn’t particularly matter what the 
determinants of justification are, so long as one accepts that raised stakes raise the threshold. In 
that context, assuming that justification is only determined by one’s reasons is an innocent 
simplifying assumption. By contrast, if you accept the degree view, as I do, it’s important that 
you clarify exactly which determinants of justification are influenced by non-epistemic factors, 
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and how. I’ve just explored how non-epistemic factors might influence which reasons we have 
(and thus propositional justification). It’s therefore worth exploring whether non-epistemic 
factors independently influence doxastic justification, that is, whether non-epistemic factors 
influence what procedures we employ in arriving at our beliefs. 
Let’s call the view that pragmatic factors help determine which procedures one employs in 
arriving at a belief the ‘procedures-determining’ view. You might find the procedures-
determining view implausible if you think that the procedures which determine doxastic 
justification are constituted by purely descriptive facts. Surely my practical or moral situation 
cannot change whether I, for example, am guilty of employing a logical fallacy. But 
epistemically relevant features of our procedures—and in particular negative features of our 
procedures—are influenced by normative facts. Consider, for example, whether someone has 
ignored relevant evidence. That factor—which is clearly an epistemically relevant feature of the 
procedure by which they formed their belief—is at least partially normative in nature. One 
counts as ignoring evidence only if there is evidence one should have attended to. And, if the 
reasons-determining view is right, whether one should have attended to certain evidence (i.e., 
whether it counts as a reason one should respond to) is partially determined by one’s practical or 
moral situation. Thus, the procedures-determining view follows from the reasons-determining 
view. 
But could there be influences on our procedures which are not also influences on our 
epistemic reasons? Plausibly. Consider two situations in which you perform a simple arithmetical 
calculation without double checking to ensure you’ve done it correctly. In a Low-Stakes 
scenario, a minor error in the calculation would have little impact on anyone. In a High-Stakes 
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scenario, an error could have devastating effects. In both cases, you have the same set of 
epistemic reasons (the numbers are the same, knowledge of procedures of arithmetic are the 
same, etc.). But it’s plausible that you should have double checked in the high-stakes scenario. If 
so, then your failure to do so may impact whether you are doxastically justified. This, then, 
would be an influence of a non-epistemic factor on one’s procedures independently of any 
influence on one’s reasons. 
Notice that the procedures-determining view has similar features as the reasons-determining one. 
They collectively allow for a function from the classical determinants of justification to 
knowledge-level justification. And they are both motivated without reference to intuitions about 
whether it is appropriate to attribute knowledge in particular cases. I’ll now argue that each is a 
crucial advantage of my view over the extant threshold accounts of encroachment. 
5.4. Two Advantages of Degree Encroachment 
In the preceding sections, I’ve aimed to show that degree encroachment is a viable account of 
how non-epistemic factors might influence whether a subject is knowledge-level justified. The 
possibility of encroachment on graded justification has been overlooked, I think, because it has 
been falsely assumed that non-epistemic factors can influence graded justification only by 
constituting reasons for or against a belief. Once the distinction between a factor constituting a 
reason and merely helping to determine it is acknowledged, degree encroachment becomes a 
more plausible account. In what remains of this chapter, I aim to show that, in addition to being 
viable, degree encroachment has two crucial advantages over the threshold mechanism: it admits 
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of independent motivation beyond the encroachment literature, and it allows for a more 
traditional relationship between epistemic factors and justification. 
5.4.1 Independent Motivation for Degree Encroachment 
Most accounts of encroachment are motivated by their ability to explain cases in which 
knowledge apparently depends on a non-epistemic factor. DeRose’s original account (2005), for 
example, relied on our accepting the judgments given in the bank cases. Similarly, recent 
accounts of moral encroachment (e.g., Moss, 2018) rely on judgments about whether it is 
appropriate to attribute knowledge in cases of high moral significance (such as the street cases). 
Much of the literature, therefore, has revolved around whether the verdicts in these cases are 
correct, and whether they might be explained without appeal to encroachment (e.g., Weatherson, 
2005). 
Like its opponents, my view can explain apparent cases of pragmatic or moral encroachment 
on knowledge. In the bank cases, for example, Keith’s high stakes apparently require him to 
enact additional procedures (e.g., calling up the bank) before forming a belief about the bank’s 
hours. Since he fails to enact this procedure, he is less justified than if he did. Moreover, he 
plausibly lacks this obligation in the low-stakes case. Thus, degree encroachment can explain our 
different verdicts across the cases. 
But since most accounts of encroachment can offer some explanation of the plausible cases 
of encroachment on knowledge, independent grounds are required for adjudicating between 
them. Much of the literature, therefore, concerns theoretical reasons that one account might be 
better than the other. Much of this debate does not leave the encroachment literature. My view, 
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by contrast, is independently motivated by arguments for normative conditions for reasons and 
procedures. The arguments given above for the reasons-determining view, for example, are 
generalizations from arguments for so-called ‘normative defeaters’ (Lackey, 2008). More 
generally, debates about the conditions under which we possess a reason or enact a particular 
procedure largely take place outside of the encroachment literature. A strength of my view, then, 
is that it can explain intuitions both within and outside of the encroachment literature. 
4.2. Epistemic Reasons and Justification 
The second advantage of my view concerns the relationship between epistemic reasons and 
knowledge. I mentioned above that the reasons-constituting view is widely regarded as facing a 
devastating ‘wrong kinds of reasons’ objection. Pragmatic reasons, for example, simply do not 
seem to be the right kinds of reasons to influence justification. Threshold accounts face a similar 
objection. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2009) has argued, for example, that threshold accounts 
unacceptably entail the truth of claims like, “S knows that p, but if it were more important, she 
wouldn’t know”. 
These considerations can be generalized into the following general objection to accounts of 
encroachment. Since knowledge-level justification is an epistemic status, whether a subject has it 
should be a function of intuitively epistemic factors such as evidence, procedures, and so forth. 
We should be able to stipulate all of the epistemic factors and know whether a subject is justified 
in believing as they do. But if any of the extant accounts of encroachment are right, then there 
can be no such function. Knowing the epistemic factors never determines whether the subject 
knows, since even in the limit case in which their evidence deductively entails their conclusion, 
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there may or may not be an additional procedure (such as double-checking their reasoning) that 
is required for knowledge. This is a powerful consideration against extant accounts of 
encroachment. 
But notice that since, on my view, non-epistemic factors help to determine which reasons and 
procedures a subject employs in arriving at her belief without influencing how these factors 
relate to knowledge-level justification, my view is consistent with the existence of a function 
from non-epistemic factors to an epistemic status like knowledge-level justification. My view is 
thus unique in positing encroachment while allowing for a traditional relationship between 
epistemic factors and statuses. 
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